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TECHNICAL PAPER
PRACTICES IN ADEQUATE STRUCTURAL DESIGN
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Challenger accident, the focus of NASA has centered on space vehicles, their problems,
their design, and their verification. The recurring question can be simply stated as: What constitutes
adequate structural design and verification? Many have attempted to answer this question. Structural
design manuals and handbooks address the subject, most very thoroughly. With all the wealth of
material, why open it again? The Challenger accident reopened every question dealing with reliability
and safety. As a result, the question became highly focused through the failure investigation and the
resulting audits for return to flight. NASA and its contractors have spent the last two years redesigning
hardware and conducting the following major audits: (1) structural, (2) fracture mechanics, (3) weld
assessments, (4) FMEA/CILs (failure mode effects analysis/critical items list), (5) hazards, (6) DCR
(design critical review) exercises, (7) FRRs (flight readiness reviews), and (8) PDRs (preliminary design
reviews) and CDRs (critical design reviews) for redesigned parts. These assessments have brought many
aspects of the question into a sharpened image. In order to see the sharper focus, however, one must
formulate subsets of questions. Some of the questions are:
/
(l) What are the roles management plays and the procedures they use?
(2) How and to what extent are philosophy, procedures, and criteria a part of good design?
(3) How important are methodology, codes, etc.?
(4) What are the roles of testing?
(5) How does documentation fit into the picture?
(6) How do performance requirements impact design adequacy, and what is the criteria for
determining adequacy?
(7) What constitutes an optimum design?
(8) What is the role of system engineering in design and verification?
(9) What effects do operations and refurbishment requirements have on design and verification?
(10) How does failure philosophy (fail safe, etc_) impact the process?
The answer to these and other questions must be tied together to form a consistent, overall approach that
will result in good, safe hardware.
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Since the 51-L incident, investigation results focused attention on safety of design, thus on desigr
audits. It is appropriate that this paper begin with a definition of a design audit. An audit is a review oJ
something that has been done relative to an accepted or proven set of criteria. In many cases the establish-
ment of these criteria is very debatable. A structural audit, for example, would challenge the design anc
verification against the design specifications (performance) given in terms of operational lifetime,
margins of safety, fracture mechanics, inspections [NDI (nondestructive inspection)] etc., all made rela-
tive to standards of management, documentation, analysis, test, data bases, as-built hardware, history,
etc. Conducting the audit is not easy since major questions have to be dealt with:
(1) Should the review be top down or bottom up?
(2) What are the standards goodness is judged against, is it concrete or the judgement of the
reviewer?
(3) How are the results (recommendations managed: (a) short term, (b) long term, and (c) future
projects?
(4) Who does the reviews: (a) independent auditors, (b) design engineers, etc?
Some of these questions also arise during the design and verification of any system. The answers to these
questions are different depending on the audit being conducted.
In order to conduct the audits, a review must first be made of all requirements followed by the
development of audit checkoff forms and questions for each discipline and each audit. As a result, trace-
ability has to be shown from requirements to performance with the adequacy of the performance
established from both analysis and test, as well as supporting documentation. As stated previously, many
audits were conducted from failure mode effects analyses to weld assessments and all are interrelated and
connected. The structure is declared safe only if all the wickets are passed or appropriate waivers with
risk assessment (rationale) developed.
The observations or guidelines discussed in this document are the result of NASA/industry parti-
cipation in these audits/reviews. Through many discussions with others, their thoughts, ideas, etc., the
author was influenced greatly in developing these ideas. It is impossible to give each credit; however,
laboratory director, Dr. George McDonough, and Vince Verderaime, laboratory technical staff, have
been both an inspiration and the source of many challenging thoughts. This paper will deal with these
observations in the areas of (1) general approaches, (2) management and control, (3) analysis and test,
(4) documentation and data basing, and (5) procedures and criteria. Mechanical disciplines alluded to
will include: (1) stress; (2) dynamics; (3) fracture mechanics; (4) NDI; (5) quality; (6) environments, (a)
thermal, (b) flow, and (c) vibration; (7) natural environments; (8) testing; (9) fatigue; and (10) system
analysis. Other disciplines are similarly scrutinized but are outside the scope of this discussion. The basic
principles are applicable, however, to all disciplines and areas.
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I1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
This paper is written basically from the engineering point of view; however, no discussion of the
engineering process is complete without a brief reference to how a project evolves and the role of
engineering with management in this early evolution.
After a national commitment for a space system, spacecraft, or space mission has been identified
and top level (level I) requirements and goals are defined, the proposed project is studied through a phase
A feasibility effort to develop significant operational, developmental and programmatical characteris-
tics, and to determine:
(1) The performance required to accomplish the mission.
(2) Time required to develop and operate the system.
(3) Funding necessary for all phases.
Level I is the overall performance requirements; level II is the basic system requirements; level III
is the spacecraft, etc., element requirements; and level IV, if it exists, is the next level down.
The three keys to the triangle of project management are: performance, schedule, and costs (Fig.
1). The test of how well the key fits is minimizing the risks and consequences involved. Is a new tech-
nology involved? Will the risk for developing it result in untimely completion and cost overruns? At this
point in time, phase A satisfactorily establishes feasibility with acceptable risks. The new technology for
Space Shuttle was the orbiter tiles. No large space project has survived initial concept where more than
one major new technology was required. Improving existing technologies does not count.
The project then proceeds to a phase B study to develop level II and III requirements, to propose
design options for satisfying requirements, and to perform trade studies for selecting the optimum design.
The resulting "request for proposal" (RFP) must identify and address all significant risks that might affect
performance, schedule, and costs. The role of engineering support to the project is most critical in this
phase for identifying risks, tasks, sensitivities, etc., that affect cost, schedules, and performance.
Requirements identified for the project and in the RFP must be stated void of solution so that
options are left open. For example, do not specify a viewing window and rule out the use of a TV
canmera which may be more versatile and cost effective. The requirement should be the capability to
observe a particular event. Options can then be evaluated on reliability, performance, consequences,
cost, etc., and the optimum selected.
These trades should be a combined exercise of project management and engineering. The result is
the final configuration selection for phase C and D (design and development), stating clearly an estima-
tion of the significant spacecraft configuration characteristics and special resources necessary through
operations.
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Figure I. Keys to the door of project management.
Configuration selection at the completion of phase B is a critical step. All pertinent information
required for phase C/D has been developed during this phase and now must be processed into a
comprehensive RFP. This requires a team effort including legal, project, contracts and procurement, and
engineering. Engineering is responsible for performance requirements, subsystems definition, data base,
and verification requirements. The RFP is followed by a Source Evaluation Board (SEB) where the con-
tractors proposals are evaluated. Engineering, as members of this board, evaluate the replies relative to
compliance with the RFP and identify the "extra-plus" contributions or lack thereof. They assess the test
program, articles required and flow, and facility capability. The result is selection of the contractor and
initiation of the project. The process and principles which are involved to some extent during phases A
and B, and are controlling during phase C/D, constitute the body of the report.
How to find your way through the design and verification maze of a project is a puzzling question
illustrated by the maze in Figure 2. What the major blocks are, how each is cleared, and how each is
integrated to form the whole are the major questions represented. In the sections that follow, the assump-
tion is made that the standard engineering approach is used, i.e., (1) define the problem, (2) conduct
simplified response and sensitivity analyses to establish understanding and limits, (3) perform detailed
analyses and test to characterize system, and (4) validate the characterization of the system. In order to
scientifically interrogate, we have to do so from a point of view. Our expectations become the spectacles
in front of the eyes that influence what we see. Therefore, in order to deal with the issues which follow, it
is important to establish an overall concept, philosophy, or approach. That viewpoint is one which sees
from each prospective the whole as well as the parts, how they interact, and everything in between. The
basis for this viewpoint is system engineering, or just system analysis and testing. All interactions, both
interdisciplinary and interphase, from concept to operations, must be tied together, including failure
criteria, such as fail safe, fail safe fail operations, etc. In all likelihood, more failures have been caused
4
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Figure 2. The maze.
from lack of systems engineering than any other one cause. Many illustrations could be given. The first
of my experience occurred on the Redstone military rocket. The vehicle was lying in its horizontal cradle
undergoing checkout of the control system. A bending mode was excited when the gyro pickup poten-
tiometer (composed of wound coil and pickup arm) jumped from one wire to the other creating step
signal changes to the control system. This signal moved the jet vanes (control force source) which further
inertially excited the mode creating a closed-loop structural control interaction problem maintaining the
oscillation. The noise of the oscillation was very loud and scary, impressing everyone that so much
energy could be present in just the inertial part of the control system. "It only hurts at resonance" was
dramatically illustrated. Since this was a small amplitude, nonlinear oscillation, it limit cycled and no
problems occurred. The fix was simple, an analog filter was used to break the loop by filtering out the
bending mode frequency component of the signal.
System analysis, system test, and system integration must be accomplished. Paramount in this
viewpoint are sensitivity investigations that identify key parameters and predict interactions. This can
and should be approached from both bottoms-up and tops-down considerations. It should be emphasized
that from wherever the process is viewed, the total picture must be kept in focus, understood, and worked
at all levels and interfaces. The pyramid view (Fig. 3) is valid for all the major blocks in the maze.
Obviously, from the top down, each level contains greater and greater details while fitting into the
whole. Management as well as analysis must fit into this concept. In making this statement it is not
implied that a very formal authority line is enforced, but only that some management or leadership should
exist at each level starting with project management down to the individual engineer, technician, etc. As
discussed later this, in general, means the acceptance of the responsibility by the man doing the job,
including communication, etc. The management approaches in books by Drucker and the latest by Peters
and others [1, 2, 3, 8, 1 l, 12, 44 through 51] adequately set the tone of what is implied by the term
management. This raises a basic problem in terms of communication between the levels, the source of
the known CEIs (contract end items), etc. It should be clear that there is also a flow between the various
major areas of emphasis. This flow is both vertical and horizontal. In general, more is required horizon-
tally than vertically. The complexity of the interaction and exchange is hard to depict; however, analysis,
test, management, and documentation must flow between disciplines and organization levels. To insure
that the system focus and approach is applied, very basic principles must be applied. The following is a
discussion of the top 12 principles.
1. Interfaces are Compatible and Well Defined
The interfaces must be compatible and well defined. This means that when crossing from one
level to another, or between categories, some form of pattern recognition, hence symbols, must be
developed and established so that only the essentials (maybe special symbols) and all aspects of the
details will be viewed. The development of these patterns/symbols (recognition approaches) is key to all
the various aspects of the design verification process. This problem is complex enough if everything is
contained in one organization; however, for aerospace in general, the multiplicity of organizations
involved in providing parts, subsystems, elements, and the verification analysis and test is very large.
The ability to provide these symbols, establish communications, and to insure compatibility is a major
problem in assuring adequacy of structural design.
i_•;i • _ _ ......_ i_ i _ ....
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2. People Are The Prime Resource
For the approach to work, it must be recognized that people are the prime resource for accom-
plishing the tasks. Other resources should be aids for the human. This will be discussed more under
management; however, it is the fulcrum about which all else pivots. This points to the next big principle.
3. Analysis and Test are Limited
All simulations, models, symbols, patterns, etc., whether dealing with analysis, test,
management, etc., are just that, models which are not complete (limited) and are not exact representa-
tions of reality but are mathematical or physical representations or symbols with various assumptions of
these facts. In the book Mathematics for Dynamic Modeling, Edward Beltran says,
"The essence of modeling, as we see it, is that one begins with a nontrivial work problem
about the world around us. We then grapple with the not always obvious problem of how
it can be posed as a mathematical question. Emphasis is on the evolution of a roughly con-
ceived idea into a more abstract but manageable form in which inessentials have been
eliminated. One of the lessons learned is that there is no best model, only better ones. The
model is 0nly a suggestive metaphor, a fiction about the messy and unwieldy observa-
tions of the real world. In order for it to be persuasive, to convey a sense of credibility, it
is important that it not be too complicated and that the assumptions that are made be clear-
ly in evidence. In short, the model must be simple, transparent, and verifiable." [53]
This principle must be fully understood so that everything is being constantly challenged for applic-
ability. The major problem we deal with is how this less-than-reality information is meshed together to
get verified, reliable systems. Obviously, this can only be done in some probabilistic sense. As is illus-
trated in Figure 4, this is the goal of a system. If it is a space system, then the goal is reliable operation
with adequate safety margins that meet the performance requirements goals. Obviously, robust statistical
approaches must fundamentally apply to insure that all outliers are understood and accepted. This raises
the next major principle.
4. Performance Requirements Drive Design
The system performance requirements determine the design, technologies, penetrations, etc.,
necessary to meet the goal. Performance requirements are always broad in scope, encompassing not only
the response but also all characteristics from design through operations. For example, if the payload-to-
orbit performance is good, but the payload must be operated only in very restricted conditions and with
great effort, the net performance may be poor. The higher the performance, by definition, the greater the
sensitivity of the design to uncertainties. Uncertainties exist inall the areas of design: materials proper-
ties, environments, analysis, testing, manufacturing, etc. If one thinks about this deep enough, a generic
curve can be constructed of sensitivity versus performance (Fig. 5).
Designs in the flat portion of the curve basically can be dealt with in a linear fashion. As the
design moves out on the curve into the steeper slopes, nonlinear analysis is implied. In the first case, the
design is inherently conservative and easily predicted, since superposition works and the nonlinearities
not used to gain margin are still present and do add to the margins. (Nonlinearities in general are conserv-
ative.) In the latter case (high performance design), use must be made of the nonlinearities in order to
8
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meet design margins criteria. It should be pointed out that nonlinearities are not easily predicted or
analyzed. They are certainly sensitive to unknowns and changes. If the performance requirements are
such that the design is inherently in this region, then great care and accuracy must be taken to develop
data bases, define environments, and perform analyses, etc. Manufacturing, nondestructive investiga-
tion, quality control, and acceptence criteria parameters must be enhanced. If, however, one designs for
robustness, the lower curve exists, providing margin at the performance index. For example, the design
option limits are (1) achieve robustness at a large increase in weight using more volume, pressure, etc.,
or (2) minimize weight at all cost, achieving performance through sophistication, including exotic
materials, etc. In option 1 (assume a launch vehicle), the added weight and size, although achieving
robustness on the surface, increases hardware cost. Option 2 bypasses this kind of cost increase but adds
cost due to the higher accuracy requirements, etc. The optimum lies somewhere between the two
extremes. The curve can also be shifted to the right through data acquisition and increased knowledge, in
many cases a desirable approach (technology advancement). At the onset and periodically throughout the
program, sensitivity studies must be made to determine where the design rests, what parameters should
be made robust, and what the real optimum is considering all factors. Other curves or data illustrate this
same type of information or sensitivity. For example, the S-N curve for a structure at or near yield shows
the same phenomenon (Fig. 6). Operating at the flat portion of the curve creates a large sensitivity of life
to small changes in alternating stress. A 5 percent increase in alternating stress can reduce life up to two
orders of magnitude.
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Figure 6. High cycle fatigue lifetime.
In this case, the part usually has limited life, small oscillating strains, and high frequencies which
lead to short lives. Implied also is the dependence on high cycle fracture mechanics as well as plastic
(nonlinear) low cycle fracture control, thus, NDI requirements become very stringent.
Three examples from the Space Shuttle program will be given to illustrate the reality of the
performance/sensitivity principles. Numerous examples exist, however, those chosen should be suf-
ficient to illustrate the principle: (1) pre- and liftoff loads, (2) max Q loads, and (3) engine 4000 Hz.
10
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a. Pre-Liftoff and Liftoff Loads
The Space Shuttle on the pad and at liftoff is a multi-body dynamic system; This is a very
complex system consisting of five Shuttle elements [payload, orbiter, external tar/k (ET), two solid
rocket boosters (SRBs), and the mobile launcher pad (MLP)]. The Shuttle is attached to the MLP through
four posts on each SRB. All external loads and the vehicle weight are reacted through these eight elastic
posts. The sequence for liftoff requires that the SSMEs be up to full power before igniting the SRBs and
lifting off. This thrust force bends the vehicle in two ways, storing energy through deforming the (elastic)
structure. The vehicle bends in the pitch plane deflecting the nose of the SRBs approximately 2 ft. This
energy is stored in struts, the SRM/MLP posts, and basic skin and structure at the strut attach points. The
second bending occurs due to the lateral component of the thrust driving the orbiter and tank between the
SRBs, rolling the SRBs in a gear train fashion. Two other parameters affect this stored energy:
(1) vehicle weight and (2) cryogenic shrinkage. Before propellant loading, the vehicle is misaligned at
the aft SRB-to-ET struts by 7 deg (struts not perpendicular to the center of the vehicle). With propellant
loading, the tank shrinks bringing the struts to the perpendicular condition, storing energy (aft tank ring
and bulkhead) in the tank. Figure 7 shows the vehicle side view on the pad, while Figure 8 shows the
stored bending moment as the SRBs are rolled in the gear train mode. Typical elastic connections are
shown as springs instead of actual hardware. To reduce loads at liftoff, the SRBs are ignited at the
minimum Y bending moment point. What parameters affect the vehicle loads and how sensitive the loads
are to these parameters are the main concerns. Key parameters are (l) the definition of the elastic
characteristics of all structures, including the MLP; (2) SSME thrust; (3) SRB thrust rise rate and thrust;
(4) winds; (5) payloads; (6) sequencing; and (7) overpressure. Because of dynamic tuning, the
unsymmetric load paths, and point loads, the vehicle response (loads) is very sensitive to small changes
in parameters. Plus or minus 20 percent in loads is common with model updates. Larger changes, 50
percent, can occur for certain parameter changes that affect payload loads. References 19 and 20 contain
many examples of these effects, however, only one is shown. Space telescope ascent loads increased
significantly due to small shifts in models to account for design changes, etc. Figure 9 shows the result-
ing load changes between three loads cycles compared to the original design estimation. Notice that the
vector load of the secondary mirror increased from 6 g to 13 g, basically due to model updates.
b. Max "Q" Orbiter Wing Loads
The first Shuttle flight showed an aerodynamic moment different from prediction, causing the
vehicle to loft more than expected. The cause was an aerodynamic distribution shift (total force was
approximately correct) due to inability to correctly simulate plume effects in the wind tunnel tests. The
small shift in aerodynamic distribution had a major effect on the wing load, and hence its structural cap-
ability. Figure 10 shows the original "qeL" capability of the wind using the predicted aerodynamic distribu-
tion. Shown on the same figure is the current best understood wing capability after beefing up structure in
the wing's leading edge. The wing root, etc., because of inaccessibility, was not beefed up to solve the
total problem. It should be pointed out, however, that to fix the total wing problem would also involve
changes to the fuselage. In order to fly safely, the trajectory shape had to be changed to fly within the
revised "qe_" boundaries shown in Figure 10. This does not come free. The cost is a several-thousand-
pound loss of payload capability. This high sensitivity of trajectory shape to loads and performance illus-
trates clearly the point being made. As a result of this effect, all Shuttle flights are specifically tailored
with stringent day-of-launch commit criteria. Details of this total area can be obtained from JSC/
Rockwell. More information on the interactions is contained in Reference 20.
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c. SSME 4000 Hz Oscillation
The SSME is a very high performance system that, on the flow side, has a very high dynamic
pressure environment. As a result, various structures are very sensitive to flow and acoustic/structural
interaction problems. Figures 11 and 12 show the lox flow system near and into the injector. The lox inlet
has a two blade splitter in order to create a more uniform lox flow distribution into the lox dome (Fig. 13).
Any type vane protrusion into this high flow environment is susceptible to flow-induced oscillations and,
thus, fatigue failure. This has occurred on the inlet splitter. Three engine units have had cracked splitters.
These fatigue cracks are believed, based on analysis and test, to be caused by vortex shedding off the
vane trailing edge occurring at the vane natural frequency at 4000 Hz. In addition to the three splitters
with cracks, several other units have shown the 4000 Hz phenomenon, but at a lower level, without
cracks. The amplitude determines the alternating stresses, hence, life. Figure 14 shows a spectrum of
an engine with and without the 4000 Hz buzz. Notice the narrowband sharpness of the tuning. The interest-
ing part of the story is that 10 percent of the engines buzz, the others do not at any time in their test
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history. There does appear to be some correlation of buzz amplitude with power level; however, the fre-
quency of the oscillation is independent of power level. The buzz cause has to be due to small manufac-
turing differences in the bluntness of the vane trailing edge and possibly small vane angle/offset dif-
ferences or slight modal shifts. There is one proposal that says the variation in shell thickness at the nose
of the vanes changes the tuning, etc., causing the vane oscillation to tune and amplify. The problem has
been fixed by sharpening the vane trailing edge and scalloping the leading edge to allow more flow area
between the two vanes. Engine 2025 buzzed around 100 gs before the fix and had no discrete 4000 Hz
component after the fix. The message is clear, high performance systems are very sensitive to small
changes, whether in manufacturing or environments, many times leading to failure or strict operational
requirements.
As stated previously, for these high sensitivity regimes, extreme care must be exercised in deiCer-
mining characteristics and operational criteria. As a result of these high tech requirements, the reliability
of the system requires greatly increased technology for testing, analysis, manufacturing, quality, etc.
Operations also, in general, become more costly with tighter constraints and loss of flexibility, along
with design and development phases. Obviously, there comes a point where the total system is more
optimum at points where structural (or other) performance is traded for weight, fuel, etc. Also, more
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emphasis on optimization selection criteria is implied for configuration selection (based on many
parameters, not just weight). Does this mean that high tech design is not pursued? In no way; however,
the implication is clear that big increases in knowledge (technology) are required, with tighter accept-
ance controls if the design is to be adequate. This means that judging a design's adequacy requires under-
standing the operation point on the sensitivity curve. Figure 15 is an attempt to flow these optimization
trades together. Notice that the process is iterative and not a one-time effort.
I PERFORMANCE
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Figure 15. Design and verification.
5. Design for Robustness and Growth
Design for robustness and growth is key. Robustness achieves overall performance, usually at the
expense of weight, but with reduced sensitivity to errors and unknowns. Growth potential provides flexi-
bility allowing for mission changes as data changes (Fig. 15).
6. Configuration Complexity Determines Penetration
Just as important is understanding the configuration complexity. It should be pointed out that in
many cases the attempt to solve one problem, even through simplicity, can create complexity in another.
Back to the system focus. This complexity is evident in many areas. Two will be discussed: (1) dynamics
and (2) static load paths.
(1) Dynamic systems are fairly predictable if they are basically a single body without extreme
geometric ratios. If the configuration is composed of several separate bodies connected by links, etc., the
characteristics are those of a redundant structure and become more predictable and sensitive. The
bodies can dynamically tune, greatly amplifying the response and reducing prediction accuracy. A more
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unsymmetricalconfigurationproducesamorecomplexproblem(seediscussiononShuttleliftoff loads).
Someargumentcanbemade,however,thatthestructuraldampingshouldbegreater.This helpsoutbut
doesnot solvetheproblem.Thelower thedamping,thegreatertheunpredictabilityof thedynamictun-
ing. It is clear that thesesystemsbecomemore susceptibleto environnmentcoupling suchasflow-
inducedoscillations.Reference20addressesthehistoryandclassesof problemsthathavetheir rootsin
complexdynamicconfigurations.
(2) Staticloadpathsarein thesamecategory.Thesimplerthe loadpath, thegreaterthepredict-
ability; the morecomplex, the lesspredictable.Unsymmetriesworsenthe situationby loadingboth in
bendingand shear,coupling everythingtogether.Thesecomplexitiesproducestressconcentrations,
quality controlproblems,andnon-planestressfields,driving requirementstowardmoredetailedanalysis
codes, testing, etc., to properly characterizethe system.
Configurationcomplexity isobviouslyadriver in determiningadequatedesign.Flagsto look for
andwork thoroughlyinvolvesymmetryversusnonsymmetry,multi-bodies,loadpaths,etc.Anotherkey
flag deals with joints, whether they are welds, bolts, connectors,or fasteners.Structuremust be
assembledwith joints. One canminimize the systemcomplexityby appropriateselection.Stresscon-
centrationsareanotherflag. Theyshouldbereducedasmuchaspossible,otherwisecontrolledbyproper
design.
7. Philosophy
Determining proper design and verification philosophy entails several major principles, for
example, design for high performance, minimum margins, or large margins to cover breakdown in
quality control, uncertainties in environments, etc. Designing for minimum margins places a large burden
on analysis, test, manufacturing, quality control, NDI, etc., in order to have a safe system. A quality,
high performing, realistic system can always be achieved but with a burden. The system is always ready
for failure with any breakdown in control and understanding, and is less amenable to performance
upgrading. Designing for flexibility in operations and increased performance is always a worthy phil-
osophy since most systems will require growth even if not forecast. Other approaches include such things
as (1) design for versus assessment for fracture mechanics, (2) failure considerations, (3) reuse versus
throw-away, (4) plan for destructive hardware evaluation, (5) design for factors on endurance limit, and
(6) use of FMEA to establish inspections, etc. If, for example, the philosophy and criteria are to
implement a fracture control plan as an integral part of the design requirements, then, the design must
include this philosophy. Fracture control can only be implemented partially if the design originally did
not consider it. Several factors come into play: material selection, weld location, inspection, etc. The
same type considerations are involved with other philosophical design options. Many other philosophical
principles exist and will crop up throughout the remainder of the report. The next principle is mandatory
in all design areas.
8. Bracketing Hand Analysis is Key to Understanding
One of the most important general principles is to make simplified hand analyses to understand
the phenomenon and guide all more indepth computer evaluations. These should include free body
diagrams and flow schematics to provide visualization. A fundamental part of this approach is the deter-
mination of the extreme or limiting cases. By establishing the physical understanding of a problem and its
bounds, greater insight and more efficiency are established. Computational approaches and testing have
become so sophisticated that without this approach gross errors, hence faulty design, occur.
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9. Statistical Significance Determines Design Adequacy
A principle that cuts across all facets of the process states that all characteristics should be stated
from both a deterministic and a statistical viewpoint. In the final analysis, these deterministic limits with
some reasonable statistical statement are all that can be relied on.
The statistical or probabilistic detertermination must consider all known variations of parameters.
These variations must include environments, models, hardware, build tolerances, materials characteris-
tics, etc., as well as safety factors or other built-in factors so that the statistical statement incorporates all
known effects and the unknown factors. There are many techniques for conducting and making these
determinations for linear systems. If nonlinear determinations must be used, the assessment is greatly
expanded, with very limited availability of tools. For example, nonlinear Monte Carlo analysis, one tech-
nique available, is very costly in terms of computer time.
The deterministic statement is made by running a discrete analysis where one or several
parameters are perturbed to the envelope limit. These analyses are extremely conservative but allow
bracketing of the system. In general, a design would not be made to these extremes. Their use is for
understanding and setting limits.
10. The Sum of Parts is Not Equal to the Whole
All the previous principles point to the next general principle to be discussed: the sum of the parts
is not equal to the whole. Or said differently, a part or component responds differently when it is separate
than it does when it is a part of the whole. As a result, we must understand interaction and sensitivities to
provide the proper design. Verification becomes even more complex in that it must account for these
extremes, including failures and their redundant paths, etc. This means that a system as well as an
individualistic approach has to be developed for analysis, testing, etc., as well as management. The
Jupiter was a classical example of control and structural coupling and how to solve the problem through
the elimination of red tape. The step rate of the pitch command of the Jupiter was in synchronous with the
liquid oxygen first propellant slosh mode which was unstable, as confirmed by flight guidance and con-
trol data evaluation. The result was a saturated control system and loss of vehicle and prestige. Analytical
and empirical models of propellant sloshing were in their infancy. This meant that a solution had to be
found quickly and verified in order to successfully launch the next vehicle. Scale model slosh tests were
started without all the detailed test readiness reviews (TRRs), test plans, etc. Many approaches were
proposed and tested. The one chosen was the so-called "beer cans" [20] where long perforated cylinders
with buoyancy spheres were floated near the surface. The verification test was made by placing an actual
tank filled with water on a railroad car and bumping it against the line stop. This means of excitation
showed qualitatively the difference between no fix and the fix. The next flight was flown successfully as
planned using the beer cans and a changed step rate pitch command. Detailed analysis and testing
followed after the flight leading to the use of baffles instead of beer cans as an operational approach. As a
result, simplified slosh models were developed for control analysis which are still valid today. A phil-
osophy was instituted that said sloshing would be damped using baffles to isolate sloshing from the con-
trol system and make the baffles an integral part of the structure, saving weight.
The previous l0 principles have dwelt essentially on the engineering side although they are
inherent in project management. The next and final two principles shift gears somewhat with the
emphasis on project and industry side of hardware.
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11. Proper Relationship Between Project Management and Science and Engineering is
Mandatory
The end goal of a project is a safe, reliably efficient product whether it is a space vehicle, its
elements, or an orbiting space system, etc. To meet this goal, it is mandatory that the roles and missions,
controls, etc., between project and science and engineering be clearly defined and understood. The phil-
osophy of how this pie is cut varies from project to project, agency to agency, and contractor to con-
tractor. There is no black and white answer. For example, can engineering override project or does
project make the final decision? How are cost and schedules used as both management tools and control
of the product? In other words, does engineering or schedule determine the design? Cost and schedules
are excellent tools yet many examples exist where inferior products resulted from over-emphasis of their
role. Clearly this definition makes the difference between adequacy and inadequacy. As shown on Figure
15. the concept/performance requirements traced through to the design verification involve project and
engineering even to the selection of the original goal, mission, or product. A proper relationship between
project and engineering is the secret to good hardware. Since this is properly under management, further
discussion is contained in that section.
12. Clearly Define the Roles and Mission Between Government and Contractor
Many approaches/philosophies are used to define the working relationship between government
and contractors. They have ranged from the stance where government was the designer/integrator with
industry playing the role of special support (subcontractor) to the government defining the performance
characteristics and industry designing, manufacturing, and verifying the product. Whichever of the many
possible roles between these two extremes is chosen, it is clear that this line must be clearly drawn.
Otherwise confusion exists, costs skyrocket, and a poor product can result.
This brings us back to the pyramid used earlier and leads us to attempt to apply these and other
principles to the areas necessary to adequate design and verification. These will be discussed in subse-
quent sections.
A set of general controlling principles has been proposed. These are listed in the summary in out-
line form.
III. MANAGEMENT
Management, in conjunction with sound engineering, is the pivotal element of structural
design. It becomes decisive at all levels adding the final edge between adequacy and inadequacy. In
general, aerospace management can be broken out into the areas of project, engineering, and corporate
(overall organization). Further complicating this structure is the relationship between government,
private contractors, and subcontractors (Fig. 16). These complex interactions raise at least three
fundamental questions:
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(1) What is the role of science and engineering versus the role of project?
(2) What is the role of government with respect to industry in delivering a product?
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Figure 16. Relationships.
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(3) What information/documentation, etc., should be required between government and con-
tractors and prime contractors and their subcontractors?
There is no simple, black and white answer to these questions; nevertheless, they must be dealt with if
adequate design is to occur. All my experience has been from the engineering side, therefore, the discus-
sion of these questions will obviously have that flavor. Also, in dealing with these questions, it is
assumed that a goal, mission, or product has been agreed upon. Essentially, the starting place is pre-
liminary design.
A. Roles of Project, Science, and Engineering
The general principle stated earlier, made mandatory that a clear, definitive statement of the roles
between project, science, and engineering be made. This is obviously a management task that must be
made at the corporate level with full involvement or definition by both project and engineering. The
respective organizations and the project complexity mission, etc., help guide the decision. There are
several options available.
From the engineering viewpoint, the agency must determine, before going into a C/D contract,
the extent of technical support required by the civil service. For very large and long term projects, many
changes may be anticipated before end item delivery and therefore some technical civil service analysis
and reviews are required continuously. The level and extent of documentation necessary could be
exhaustive or just include areas of known high risk as a minimum. If project management is unwilling to
commit a technical civil service level equal to 7 to 10 percent of the contractors' engineering staff, then
contracting for extensive documentation is wasteful - there will not be enough civil service to review it
intelligently. However, all analysis performed by the contract is government entitled and must be
deferred up to three years after the end item is delivered. The format, content, and cost will be negotiated
if and when required. This is a very important consideration and it controls the car loads of paper to be
processed by the government and can cause costs to sky rocket.
To better understand the need for civil service technical support and contracted documentation,
we must understand the type contracts requiring it. When projects are contracted to develop and deliver
an end item, the contractor is responsible for all engineering analysis and it would seem that documenta-
tion of analysis is not required for civil service technical reviews. In fact, contractors may even prefer no
civil service technical interference. Since technical changes to the existing contract are frequent
occurrences on large, complex projects, the civil service must make an independent judgement based on
analysis on whether or not to accept and pay for this change. Rather than initiating an independent analy-
sis, a less manpower intensive approach is to review the contractors' documents for assumptions, analyti-
cal errors, oversights, and margins. This simple condition unfolds two important and costly efforts: (1)
a comprehensive set of documents and data must be delivered to the agency as developed; and (2) the civil
service analysis and reviews must be current with the contractors' activities; otherwise, decisions for
accepting a change would be horribly delayed contributing to schedule losses and overruns. An equally
important function the engineer serves the project manager is that in possessing the contractor analytical
documentation, the civil service can perform timely assessment of critical and risk areas for accuracy and
choose to perform independent analysis when indicated. Contractor discrepancies may then be brought to
immediate attention for early resolution.
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In NASA, one model that has been used successfully works around the following philosophy.
Science and engineering is a technical recommending body not concerning (over statement) itself with
cost and schedules, providing the engineering data recommendations and risks; whereas, project is the
decision-making body using these recommendations. The project also manages the manufacturing, cost,
schedules, etc. This allows engineering to make a more thorough technical assessment without burden of
other concerns. If this approach is to work, then project has to be keenly attuned to engineering, constant-
ly seeking them out, providing the resources, and changing cost and schedules if necessary to get a good
product. Many examples exist where project would not buy into sound engineering recommendations,
living to regret the decision when future test or operations bore out the engineering position. In deference
to my good friends in project who have made these decisions with probably just programmatic cause,
and, because engineering makes wrong decisions also, only one illustration will be cited.
The Hubble Space Telescope program started out as a program totally controlled by the project.
Project management would be responsible for both engineering and hardware integration. The con-
tractors and government engineering would interface through project. Documentation provided by
industry would be centrally located with very limited informal exchange between contractors and govern-
ment engineers. As the program developed under this approach, critical technical, cost, and schedule
problems developed. In order to solve the issues, both technical and hardware, it became necessary to
form joint project and engineering government teams at each prime contractor plant. This team approach
was in place for a least one year. After dissolving the formal teams, project and engineering have con-
tinued to work very closely with an open and informal exchange between all involved. Also, as a part of
the early corrective actions, panels or technical working groups between government and industry were
organized, enhancing the information exchange and communications. It is clear from this experience that
for very complex technical systems pushing the state-of-the-art, projects must be operated differently
from basic state-of-the-art projects. The approach chosen for project/engineering interfaces must con-
sider many factors such as industry complexity, technical complexity, program complexity, etc. As was
illustrated by space telescope, the involvement of stringent science requirements in conjunction with the
resulting technical/hardware and operations complexity creates a very complex and demanding integra-
tion management situation. In general, for any project the integration tasks are viewed only from the
hardware viewpoint such as fit or dimension criteria, etc. In reality, as discussed earlier, the systems
viewpoint must concentrate also in engineering, simulating all interacting disciplines, subsystems, etc.
Project's role in balancing between cost, schedules, and performance must include constantly dealing
with risks. Risks become the criteria through which decisions are reached. The other prime tasks of
project deal with manufacturing and delivery of quality hardware. Obviously, project must be in a con-
stant act of balancing between these various complex goals. The other extreme arises when project takes
the full responsibility using engineering only when they see the need, setting the tasks, priorities, etc.
Regardless of the roles chosen for each, it is clear that project and engineering must be integrated
into a team approach which properly trades between requirements, performance, cost, and schedules
using risks as one of the criteria for decision making.
B. Roles of Government and Industry in Adequate Design
Just as important as the roles definition between project and engineering is the roles between
government and industry. Two extremes are: (1) government provides a contract with performance
requirements clearly stipulated; the contractor designs, engineers, manufactures, and delivers the
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hardwareverified to meetthe requirements;theonly interactionsareperiodicstatusreviews;delivered
documentationmainly centersaroundoperationsandmaintenance;and(2) thegovernmentdesignsand
engineersandindustrymanufacturesthe hardwareundergovernmentsurveillanceandcontrol; thecon-
tractorprovidesno warrantyexceptengineeringresponsibilityonly from themanufacturingstandpoint;
the governmentprovidesall drawings,specifications,etc. In betweenis a third andprobablythemost
commonNASA approach:(3) the governmentprovidestherequirementsandvarious levelsof surveil-
lancein all areasthroughreviews,parallelengineeringpenetrationof critical problems,andtesting.The
contractoris prime for design,engineering,drawings,manufacturing,testing,verification,etc. This is
essentiallyateameffort whereindustryprovidesthebulk of themanpower,etc.Onhigh-techprogramsit
allows for efficient changes,understanding,etc.Frominitiation, project/managementhasto providethe
resourcesfor theextragovernmentinvolvement.It is morecostlybut canleadandshouldleadto abetter
product.
In summary, how a project is managed,controlled, etc., determinesthe output. Since
managementandcontrolareinherentin all areasof structuraldesign,verification,andoperations,it must
be first and includenot only peoplebut all resources,criteria, procedures,requirements,reviews,etc.
Figures2, 3, and 17showhow engineeringmanagementcutsacross,or is inherentin, all aspectsof the
process.
Therepresentationdoesnot imply the lackof levelof autonomyin eachstructuredorganization
level nor, asdiscussedearlier, thatit is a highly dictatorialfine line of authoritybut that it mustflow up
anddownandbe integratedwith theresponsibilityincurredby the individualdoingthework. This does
not rule out theuseof skunkworks, adhocgroups,teams,or anyothermeansthatbring out thecrea-
tivity, innovation, etc., of all involved. The implication is merely that managementor guidanceis
involved at all levels.Observinghigh levelmanagementreviewsfor manyyears,oneconclusionstands
out: thepersonwheretherubbermeetstheroadis thesourceof thejudgementof therightnessor wrong-
nessof the system.All elseis wordsmithingandpapermill traceability.Thelatterbeingemphasizedat
theexpenseof theformer. WhatI amtrying to sayis this: traceabilitycontrol, reviews,etc., areneces-
saryand very important,but shouldneverget in theway of engineering.In particular,the discussion,
judgement,innovation,assumptions,etc., thattakeplaceat all levelsaretheingredientsthat determine
designgoodness.Theonly realresourcewehaveto tapandmotivateis thehumanengineeringexhibited
in thediversepersonalitiesin theorganizations.Managementmustrecognizewherethepoweris andput
its emphasison the major resource- People.All elseis tools for makinghim moreefficient.
1. People
Saying this means that the first and foremost task of management and control is leading people,
the prime resource. I learned a very valuable lesson in this regard many years ago while coaching a
basketball team. The game belongs to the players, the coach is only a leader. The team that wins is a team
where all the players and all support personnel have accepted the challenge to win and have taken the
responsibility to keep physically and mentally fit, sharpen their skills, concentrate on team plan, and
work for the good of all. The same is true of engineering a complex system. Individual responsibility and
growth (internalized acceptance of the challenge, the objectives) at every level and job, working for a
common goal is the secret. Managers must recognize that their task is of leadership in these areas and
they are not directors. Again, in the final analysis, the game belongs to the players. Even planning must
be accomplished by all at every level.
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2. Vision
One of the priority tasks of management and a fundamental part of leading people at any level is
providing or establishing vision through living it. The vision provides meaning and focus to an organiza-
tion. In the book of Proverbs it says "where there is no vision, the people perish," (Proverbs 29:18).
Surely the same is true for an organization. Visions have two very real effects: (1) they provide the
overall tone or goals of an organization, what it is and what it is becoming, and (2) visions are created in
each individual at whatever level he or she is, providing inspiration, motivation, energy, challenge,
direction, etc., producing development and growth. Belongingness becomes a major attitude. Maybe in a
real sense, a culture is created. Many words can be used to describe the effect of vision: inspiring,
empowering, directing, motivating, etc. To create the organizational, and thus, the individial vision,
requires management to build and invent images, symbols, etc. These, in turn, develop the meaning, the
culture, required to foster in every worker his own visions. It is only effective to the degree that it is
caught and lived by every organizational element and individual. Fundamental in all this are some
subprinciples. One that has common usage is "a catalyst to change is education," remembering that it is
only through change in individuals that the goal is achieved. Somewhere in the distant past, I read or
heard a statement of another important principle related to change that went something like this, "to gain,
you must lose." Something must be given up for growth which requires loss. Losing hurts and the hurts
must be dealt with. Also, to give up something and reach for an unknown is risk taking. Leading people
to vision, whatever the technique, requires that the management understand the educational and loss
principles. The manager is dealing with the lives of individuals including his own and this cannot be dealt
with lightly. Good management is never easy; in fact it too is costly. It is not the intention here to deal
with the hows of implementation, the management books referenced cover this from all aspects.
3. Perspective
The perspective from which one views the problem is different at each level. At the top, one does
not see or at least manage or plan the details of a parts analysis or test. At this level, the view must be
broad (of the whole) while understanding the need for the indepth, concentrating on the overall results
while leaving the details to the lower level. Conversely, the detailed analyst must plan and execute the
details of the part without managing or planning the details of the overall. He does, however, have a big
impact upon the overall through communication, dedication, etc.
4. Approaches
Management styles are very diverse: individualistic or group, autocratic or democratic, etc. There
are many choices, however, no one approach is absolute. All must be adapted to the personality of the
individual. In other words, do not get carried away mimicking someone else. Be yourself while applying
some basic principles and common sense. While coaching earlier in my professional life, the principal of
the school where I taught gave me a valuable lesson. He had been a very successful coach and envisioned
coming into the gym each day helping a new young coach get his feet on the floor. After one week we
had a discussion in which he said, "Coach, I can't help you with the practice, it won't work. You haveto
do it your way. I can only help by giving you observations away from the players. I have to transpose
myself into your thought process to help." What insight into the very basics of management.
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5. System Emphasis
The hardest management problem I have observed in the aerospace world is: How do you insure
that the systems approach (systems engineering) is understood and accomplished? The tendency is to
become narrow, only focusing on either a part, a special discipline, or test, etc. While this has to be done
for penetration, etc., it must occur in the system context. Several attempts have been made to solve this
problem. All have merit, however, the one general characteristic that appears is: Regardless of the
forum, there must be an air of openness and technical integrity. This must be emphasized to such an
extent that no one is afraid to raise a concern, issue, or opinion. Diverse disciplines discussing and
commenting on each others area is fundamental to a system focus.
A fairly successful approach was instituted by Level II integration for the Space Shuttle program.
Figure 18 is a schematic depicting part of the system. Notice that the final Level II programmatic deci-
sion is made by the Program Requirements Change Board (PRCB), however, an elaborate system of
supporting arms is in place to provide information, etc. One arm is the Systems Integration Review
(SIR). The SIR has two major support groups: the Propulsion System Integration Group (PSIG) and
the Ascent Flight Systems Integration Group (AFSIG). Only AFSIG is shown on the chart. The funda-
mental characteristic of PSIG and AFSIG is that they are engineering recommending groups, not
program decision making bodies. This creates an atmosphere of openess with emphasis on engineering.
Supporting AFSIG and reporting to it are the various technical panels (loads, control, performance, etc.)
who meet to work their problems. All levels of exchange exist between the panels and AFSIG. Recom-
mendations carried from AFSIG to the SIR and PRCB are generally introduced by AFSIG, but the tech-
nical side is presented by the panels. The same holds true for PSIG. Members of AFSIG/PSIG are the
various technical discipline leads and program leads from affected NASA centers. Contractors are ad hoc
representatives. The panels, however, draw their membership from both NASA and its contractors and
include all relative disciplines. Problems, concerns, etc., are therefore vertical and horizontal, producing
overall completeness. The freedom to move up and down or to the sides is one key to success. All
criteria, analysis, tests, etc., flow through the groups. Because of this flexibility, a panel or panels can be
asked to penetrate a concern by any group above through AFSIG or can, on their own, penetrate a
problem.
Other approache s have worked equally well for short periods of time (less than 1 year) to work a
particular problem. This is accomplished by creating an information center, interdiscipline, government/
contractor co-located ad hoc group to solve the problem. At least three activities in the Shuttle world
involving major problems were worked in this manner: (1) Shuttle main engine (verification of SSME for
the first Shuttle flight, (2) orbiter tile (reentry heat protection system), and (3) SRM redesign (redesign-
ing SRM to eliminate the cause of the 51-L accident). The idea of ad hoc teams is at least two-fold: (1)
isolate them from other problems, concerns, etc., and (2) have all disciplines and project together to
insure crosstalking, communications, and reduce problem solution time. The skunk works approach is
essentially the same.
Another technique which can be used to accomplish the same system goals is the design review.
However, many come too late except for removal of critical problems. These program reviews are
sequential starting with (1) Preliminary Requirements Review (PRR), (2) Preliminary Design Review
(PDR), (3) Design Requirements Review (DRR), (4) Critical Design Review (CDR), (5) Design Certifi-
cation Review (DCR), and (6) Flight Readiness Review (FRR). Various programs will use different
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names for this same approach. Special reviews and audits can also be interspersed to further augment the
confidence. A simpler way of looking at this is shown on Figure 19 which treats the areas as configura-
tion traceability improvements, technical interchange meetings, and validation. A partial listing of what
is in each is included.
6. Training and Selection
A major problem throughout management is the training and selection of future managers. This
process is of major importance to the future of any organization, but is just as important to the adequacy
of design and verification. In general, two overriding skills are required for management: (1) social skills
and (2) technical skills. Selections tend to be made on the technical skills level, yet most of a managers
time is spent handling people. Regardless, once a manager is selected he must perform three tasks well if
he is to succeed: (1) conceive, (2) sell, and (3) follow through. The ability to see interrelationships and
their visualization is the secret to communication. Communication is not listed in the three tasks since it
is a skill cutting across everything. Obviously, many other things are important, such as integrity, and
should be included in the criteria for selection. Organizations are clearly guilty of not emphasizing the
manager selection/training enough.
7. Communication
Information flow, communications development, and update of symbols (data patterns, etc.) are
other prime tasks of management. Modern day computers with all the special software for data basing,
graphics, etc., have put an excellent tool in the managers hands to accomplish this task. The symbols
(patterns) and the supporting data bases must be accomplished for all areas such as personnel, resources,
testing, engineering, documentation, etc. For example, when the time comes to certify a design for
operations, two major tasks exist for management: (1) insure that the hardware indeed technically has
met all requirements, and (2) show traceability of how the requirements flow down and have been met.
The first implies revisiting indepth all engineering while the second is essentially a paper trail. Figures 20
through• 24 were developed by Rocketdyne to illustrate at a top level how these two tasks were accom-
plished for the SSME for the first Shuttle reflight following the Challenger incident. Figure 20, going
clockwise, traces the requirements through the hardware to the as-built/design capability. Figure 21 starts
with the system description moving through all pertinent requirements and controls. Figure 22 is the
documentation trail from requirements verification, while Figure 23 gives the total part history. Figure 24
lists the verification requirements documents by assemblies. This document includes the requirements
and verification plan, including verification complete sign-offs. Many other approaches have been used
and work. This example was not chosen because it is necessarily best, but as a means of illustrating part
of the manufacturing and control required to assure adequate design and verification.
8. Summary
Before leaving this snapshot of the managment role in assuring adequacy of structural design and
verification, it is necessary to return to key areas mentioned.
a. Emphasize People
The first and foremost is that people are the fundamental resource that makes or breaks design. If
that is true, what can managers do? Nothing much new is on the scene, however, basic principles alluded
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• ESSENTIALLY 25 LEVEL IV CEI's CATEGORIZED BY MAJOR COMPONENT AND/OR
SUBSYSTEM
• PROVIDES ALL DESIGN AND VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AT COMPONENT
LEVEL
• PROVIDES TRACEABILITY TO THE CEI/ICD
DOCUMENT TITLE DOCUMENT TITLE
DVS-SSME-101
DVS-SSME-102
DVS-SSME-106
DVS-SSME-201
DVS-SSME-201
DVS-SSME-202
DVS-SSME-203
DVS-SSME-204
DVS-SSME-205
DVS-SSME-206
DVS-SSME-303
DVS-SSME-304
DVS-SSME-305
DVS-SSME-401
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
GIMBAL BEARING ASSEMBLY
POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM
CONTROLLER - VOLUME 1
CONTROLLER SOFTWARE - VOLUME 2
ELECTRICAL HARNESS ASSEMBLY
INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
FLOWMETERS FOR LH 2 AND LO 2 SERVICE
IGNITION SYSTEM
FASCOS CONTROLLER
THRUST CHAMBER ASSEMBLY
HOT GAS MANIFOLD
FUEL AND OXIDIZER PREBURNER
ASSEMBLIES
LPOTP ASSEMBLY
DVS-SSME-402
DVS-SSME-403
DV,S-SSME-404
DVS-SSME-508
DVS-SSME-510
DVS-SSME-511
DVS-SSME-512
DVS-SSME-513
DVS-SSME-514
DVS-SSME-515
DVS-SSME-516
DVS-SSME-517
LPFTP ASSEMBLY
HPOTP ASSEMBLY
HPFTP ASSEMBLY
CHECK VALVES
PNEUMATIC CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLEXIBLE AND HARD DUCTS AND LINE
ASSEMBLIES
HYDRAULIC ACTUATION SYSTEM
HEAT EXCHANGER
STATIC SEALS
PROPELLANT VALVES
FUEL AND OXIDIZER BLEED VALVE
ASSEMBLIES
POGO SUPPRESSION SYSTEM VALVE
ASSEMBLIES
.q Figure 24. Design verification specifications (DVS).
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to by Drucker [45,46,47], Peters [44,48,49]. etc., need repeating. First, whatever the individual has of
value to the organization is within himself. As Drucker says, "His development is not something done to
him, it is not another or better way of using existing properties. It is growth, and growth is always from
within. The work therefore must encourage the growth of the individual and must direct it" [45]. This
means that all work must challenge the worker, motivate him to want to contribute and grow. Whether
one does this by objectives, managing by walking around or all the other techniques required to get the
worker in the right job and be a part of the organization is up to the individual manager. Recognizing the
principle of the human resource is not optional if an organization is to insure adequate design. This means
that somehow the responsibility has to be put at the bottom of the pyramid used initially and not at the top
as is generally thought. Inverting the pyramid as Peters suggests is very close to the concept being
pursued. This means that individual responsibility is the key to performance. It also means that he is a
part of the organization, that information flows up and down, that he feels a part of success or failure of
the product, and that management is a support to him for accomplishing his tasks. In other words, he
should participate in the planning. This is even more true of the professional workers with which the
report is dealing.
Technical management or professional management is not addressed extensively in literature, yet
that is what aerospace and, in particular, structural adequacy of aerospace systems is all about. How the
bottoms up and tops down is implemented is not absolute. The basic principles are clear and involve (I)
value of individual, (2) traceability from requirements to validation, (3) technical knowledge and under-
standing, (4) communication, (5) vision/culture acceptance and values.
b. Prioritize Tasks
One task inherent in the others discussed, but mandatory in the aerospace field is the planning/
meshing of tasks and resources to the right areas. Drucker made the observation that 10 percent of the
effort accomplished 90 percent of the results, while 90 percent of the effort is expended to obtain 10
percent of the results [46]. Cost, etc., follows the same general trend. Obviously, for all organizations,
this statement is partly true, only the percentages are debatable. This means that one of the principles of
management and, therefore, a prime task is to understand the tasks, set proper priorities, and allocate
resources to emphasize results. As stated previously, it is very easy for management to fall into the trap
of letting the project/crisis do the prioritization and resources allocation, aggravating the problem (Fig.
25). Management must make judgements on which tasks have a real payoff (results) and put the
resources against these tasks. In most cases, for example, in analytical understanding of structural
characterization, 90 percent of the knowledge can be obtained fairly cheaply while acquiring the addi-
tional 10 percent of the answer is very expensive. Many times a simple redesign (for example, changing
fastener bolts to higher strength to eliminate detailed nonlinear analysis) can be implemented quickly,
reducing analysis and testing costs substantially. This reinforces some of the statements made relative to
performance versus sensitivity.
c. System Focus
Management must create the system focus and must set the performance requirements that put
technical excellence and integrity above schedule and cost. Otherwise; project schedules/cost become the
management tool and criteria leading to insufficient products. Space Exploration depends on highly reli-
able technology and cannot afford these deteriorations. This does not in any way remove the importance
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Figure 25. Conflict of expectations.
of schedules/cost but puts them in the right focus. A complicating factor for aerospace is illustrated on
Figure 26. In such a technology extending field, there must be a balance and interaction between ongoing
projects, future projects/strategic, and technology mentioned above. If too much emphasis is placed on
ongoing projects, the schedules and demands of the project control and manage leaving nothing to future
goals and the development of the technology to insure it. Even the technology required to solve project
development and verification problems is very short sighted and short lived. In other words, without
special attention, any technology resulting from project tasks is incidental. With planning based on tech-
nology shortages uncovered in project work, good short-term practical technology applicable to several
projects will result. A better approach is to combine with the project-focused technology, a base tech-
nology plan that is more generic and future oriented. This produces and insures a healthy organization
with proper skills, resources, etc., to handle future programs. This latter effort (base technology) can be
accomplished in NASA either as a part of the development center's manning or at the research centers. It
probably is a mistake to put it all at either one or the other center. The development centers drive tech-
nology needs and do the practical application, while research centers do best at developing long term
research techniques. Both need to be involved and communicating. Fundamentally, project management
and engineering must be a team that collectively sets proper priorities and goals, allocates resources pro-
perly, and integrates analysis, testing, hardware, and operations. As one manages this tri-focus, interac-
tion and proper balance are necessary at most levels. In order to have healthy organizations and insure
present and future structural integrity, both engineering and project must share equally in making this
happen.
This task is complicated by the fact that engineering tends to spend its energy on problem solving
and potential problem analysis with minimal efforts on visions and conceptualization, although any
project, hardware, etc., is the result of the vision process. In other words, the foundation of any
aerospace effort is the conceptualization. The success, however, hinges on the ability of organizations
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and individuals to solve problems and avoid potential problems. This latter effort is not routine, maybe
not as glamorous as the visionary stages, but requires a high degree of innovation and insight challenging
the very best of talents and skills. This effort results in the operating hardware fulfilling the original
visions and dreams. The task that management faces is how to keep all these efforts in focus. The danger
in problem analysis is the negative emphasis that kills the enthusiasm for moving forward. The optimistic
viewpoint is very necessary for success.
The lessons learned in the management/control area for aerospace are outlined in the summary.
IV. ANALYSIS AND TEST
What is the overriding principle in analysis and test? Where must the focus be? What is the
viewpoint that shapes all that is done that drives the process? Is it not developing and having a firm
foundation of basic principles, not detailed analytical formulations but pure and simple understandings
and representations of the concepts and principles? Gordon's two books, "Structures, Why Things Don't
Fall Down" and "The New Science of Materials or Why You Don't Fall Through the Floor," are two
examples of the concepts and viewpoints being discussed. No engineer, regardless of his discipline,
should be without these books. Books of the same nature exist for other areas. They teach you how .to
visualize and think a concept through. All good engineering starts there. The rest are a]ds. Coupled with
this are the simple hand analyses with free body diagrams, flow, etc. Each engineer must accept this
challenge and the corresponding responsibility for growth and reaching the defined objectives. Once
these principles are internalized, good structural design results (see section on management).
4O
The pyramid concept (Fig. 25) fits analysis and test perfectly. System analysis must be performed
first at the top to define generic data flowing from there down. After the initial loop, both bottoms up and
tops down intermingle. This intermingling, however, must always keep the system focus. Figure 27
shows a flow of the basic system task from an analysis and test standpoint showing the waterfall and the
iteration loop. Not all interacting disciplines are shown; however, those illustrated are fundamental to
structural integrity. Structural integrity is inherent within each of the individial disciplines such as
propulsion as well as the overall systems structure. In other words, the structure must withstand all
propulsion induced environments while not reducing the basic performance. Through the process of
system analysis, in conjunction with sensitivity and optimization studies, a balance in design, reliability,
performance, and margins can be achieved which minimizes cost and assures robustness. Figure 27 does
not show how this is accomplished, yet this is a mandatory task in structural integrity. All have seen the
comical charts illustrating how designs would evolve if the focus was on a single discipline such as
propulsion or control. Clearly, design must optimize between structures (including weight), propulsion,
flight mechanics, control, loads, and stress. Structures become fundamental in these trades. How you
shape structure, join structural elements, integrate elements, etc., plays a major role in the resulting
integrity. The various interacting disciplines must provide some general constraint/sensitivity type algo-
6thms to this process to balance or optimize the system. For example, if one is designing a control
system, the mass, etc., of the control effectors becomes a key item. Trades between structural geometry,
passive damping, etc., versus active control levels produces a design with more integrity. Not shown in
this loop are the other interloops between criteria, philosophy, and documentation. For example, whether
one designs for no failures, fail safe, fail safe-fail operations, etc., has a big influence on the design and
or the analysis and test approaches, schedules, and resources. Vertical and horizontal communications
are imperative. The statistical method used to treat parameter variations and failures has the same impact.
These areas will be discussed later.
A. Analysis
As mentioned previously, an early part of the analysis process is the combined optimization sensi-
tivity studies. These studies start at the total system simulation level and progress down to comparable
studies that are conducted at each level including the piece parts in many cases (Fig. 28). It should be
pointed out that these do not stop with the design selection but continue as more knowledge is acquired
and design changes ensue. Completion occurs only when design is validated and in operation and then
only if no problems occur.
The importance of developing these data trends focuses the process identifying major areas of
concern. Coupled with this data must be a developed set of patterns and symbols that include interacting
flow diagrams, free body diagrams, limiting cases, and hand or simplified analyses. As stated pre-
viously, limited conditions or bracketing analyses are a fundamental part of this simplified work. It
should be pointed out again that these occur at all levels, in all program phases, for all disciplines and
must be communicated in all directions. In the final essences of the process, the engineer working the
problem is responsible for the planning and communications. It is not enough just to know certain facts.
1. Illustration of Approach
For illustration purposes only, structural analysis will now be carried up and down through the
tiers of activity. Obviously, all areas such as control will require the same process. Various approaches
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exist for determining structural loads and the resulting structural margins. Figure 29 is a very simplified
flow diagram of the approach. These margins are stated as stability, safety factors on ultimate and yield
stresses, fracture limits, fatigue lifetime, reuse criteria, stability limits, and operational criteria. Regard-
less of the techniques chosen, consistent and compatible approaches must be used starting with the
system analysis, system loads analysis, and continuing through elements to the smallest part analysis.
The approach chosen for structural design and verification must be comprehensive, consistent,
and focused. Therefore, it is necessary that common models, environment data bases, analysis
approaches, and criteria be employed by all vehicle or system elements to insure a compatible system
risks assessment. The assurance that this happens involves proper organization and control
(management).
Up front, the basic problem facing structural analysis and verification should be clearly stated.
The problem: All analyses are simulations which are not complete (limited), which attempt to predict
trends of what will happen. The same is true of test. As discussed in the general section, all these partial
attempts to model or test reality are melded together. How these many pieces are put together determines
the validity of the design.
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The basic concept and philosophy of this approach are shown in Figure 30. The process starts
with each element and its subelements providing the structural models and all pertinent parametric data
(example: SRB thrust, thrust rise rate, pressure) to the integration organization for the system loads
analysis. These models must be compatible with all other element models and with the final element
stress analysis models. The system integration approach, parameter variations, statistical criteria, and
verification required are determined in various ways. Using these criteria, loads analysis for each design
condition (parameter combinations with natural environments) are to be conducted and loads developed.
Figure 30 shows some of the natural and induced environments used to determine the loads. These
analyses are made in a statistical manner such that the resulting responses (loads, etc.) are at a 99.7 per-
cent probability or some other predetermined level of occurrence when varying all system parameters and
environmental values within the expected range. Included are all vehicle parameters and natural environ-
ments, such as wind speed, wind shears, and wind gusts.
2. Integrated Analysis
The approach used to generate loads will now be elaborated on for the Space Shuttle liftoff regime
in order that the external loads analysis process is better understood. The first step (Fig. 30) utilizes test-
verified dynamic models of each element (SRB, ET, SSME, orbiter, payload, MLP). These models are
coupled together using proper interface models in conjunction with either substructuring or modal
coupling techniques. This step produces an overall vehicle dynamic model. Step 2 takes this complicated
dynamic model and descriptions of all known forces and formulates a set of describing differential
equations which, when integrated time-wise, will describe the characteristics of the structure. Integration
of the resulting equations, using either digital or hybrid computers, produces the responses and external
loads (step 3). Since the generalized forces are not precisely known (i.e., only known to a test-verified
statistical level) a discrete load case will not describe the design load. In phase IV, these characteristics
are used as forcing functions to obtain more detailed knowledge of each element. Phase V uses the output
from phase IV to accomplish even greater detail information of parts, critical areas, etc. This output
establishes all margins, etc., used for design or verification.
This chart does not deal with the procedures, codes, etc., required to accomplish these steps.
These choices depend on many factors, such as complexity, skills, computational equipment, etc. How-
ever, with modern day computers, integrated output should be maximized as shown on Figure 31.
• -:)
J • i
Notice that automated outputs such as loads and stress matrices feed directly to the stress analysis
as does loads spectra to the fatigue. This reduces chances for errors and increases efficiency. All the
interacting flows and iterative loops are shown. Loads and stress analysis, although considered by many
to be separate disciplines, must be really worked together or at least very closely with constant commu-
nication. Obviously, thermal and control fall into the same category. The chart clearly shows the inter-
action between different steps and between loads and stress. The Shuttle SRB aft skirt failure illustrates
the requirement for communications and interaction. Early Shuttle loads analyses conducted using
simplified models of the launch pad and the SRB skirt produced a set of loads that, overall, was thought
to be accurate for the prelaunch SSME thrust buildup phase of launch. It was understood that major skirt
load would arise from vehicle weight combined with the SSME thrust force. At full thrust, the four hold-
down posts,_way_fi'om_the 'altimeter (Fig. 8) are loaded in compression not only from weight but also from
the vehicle bending dale ti) <the SSME thrust. What was not understood was the sensitivity of the local
weld stress •near the holddown post to the pad stiffness. Stated differently, the radial load component
(Fig. 32) shows how the compressive load creates the large tension stress in the weld. The skirt angle
• :?; , i;
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splits this compressive load into two components, one axial and the other radial. The radial component,
depending on the pad stiffness, moves the posts Outward, bending the skirt skin locally creating high
tension stress. Figure 33 shows the sensitivity of the local weld stress to radial load changes. Two skirts
have failed in structural test due to this effect. To date no credible failure mode has been identified.
Coupon testing shows that large strains (2.5% or greater) are required in the weld area and, in the heat
affected zone, the highest stress measured in the structural test at failure was 0.8% strain. Additionally,
the loads generated for the design case were based on varying parameters to maximize the average load in
the skirt post, not the local load where the failure occurred. As a result, special materials testing has been
required, a detailed test verified MLP and local skirt models were developed, and additional loads cases
developed. Several messages are apparent: (1) understand the sensitivity; (2) develop models, analyses,
etc., to cover that sensitivity; and (3) provide for healthy interdiscipline communication. The
requirement for communication and understanding between disciplines is clearly illustrated.
This is a good place to deviate slightly and discuss the requirements of high performance systems
for an adequate but nonconservative statistical statement of loads and structural margins. The general
approach has been to calculate loads and determine a 3o. equivalent static peak load. This equivalent static
3o- peak load is applied to the stress model to get static stress. Safety factors are then applied to the static
stress. If one wants to take out some of the conservatism inherent in this approach, one must apply statis-
tical techniques. The best way to achieve this is by using the approach shown on Figure 29 where an
integrated analysis is performed where the output is stress, etc. Several codes are being and have been
developed that will accomplish this with stress as the output. Many statistical or probabilistic approaches
are available that produce time consistent stresses in any form desired. This includes the spectra for
fatigue. Obviously, if other states (strain, deflection) are desired, these can be calculated in the same
manner. The message is clear. If analysis is to stay up with the performance requirements, then an
integrated approach is required. This approach leads to a more definitive probabilistic statement, usually
less conservative than the classical methods of the past. The problem that many feel in a probabilistic
approach is the loss of the commonly used safety factors and margins of safety replaced by the prob-
abilistic statement. Retraining/education is required to bridge this gap.
3. Subsystem Analysis
The next level of analysis and test develops the same kind of detailed flow for the resulting dis-
ciplines and margins such as fracture mechanics, fatigue, vibroacoustics, structural, static, and dynamic
testing. Figure 34 shows this next level for one fracture mechanics plan for part of the SRM. Notice that
it starts with the stresses from the stress analysis and proceeds to use special fracture mechanics analysis,
materials data base development, analog testing, NDE, proof testing, etc., to arrive at a verified system
for flight. Along with this flow and testing, there is a need for parametric data which shows crack initia-
tion, crack growth, crack instability, etc., so that one can deal with damage to learn design approaches.
Figure 35 shows the same detailed flow for fatigue life assurance including test and verification. This is
essentially the same flow depicted in Reference 52.
References 7 through 43 are more detailed reports dealing with the specifics of the approach laid
out. Implementation of these approaches requires the development of detailed procedures, methods,
codes, etc., to carry out the task. It is very important that these be developed and updated to assure good
analysis.
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Procedures,codes,etc.. arenot thetotal story.Two key ingredientsmakethesystemwork: (1)
the accuracyof the input datasuchasmaterialspropertiesand environments,and (2) the modeling
assumptionsandmodeldevelopment.Theoutputisnobetterthantheinput.Thevalidationprocessis the
final analysistask.Figure 36 illustratesthe flow andthe variouspartsstartingwith requirementsand
proceedingto the as-built hardware.The model validation is a continuousprocessfrom early in a
programto theend. It involvesthe sensitivityanalysisbutmoreimportantlythetestingto bediscussed.
In general,analysisis only asgoodasthevalidationtestingwhetherit is to setparametricdataor final
model verification.
4. Aids
Many aids. in terms of handbooks, data bases, and general principles, are needed to guide analy-
sis. aid understanding, and interpret data. References 17 through 43 have many examples of this type of
information. Figure 37 shows the relationships of applied load history, strength, and damage size with
time. Obviously, this curve exists for each material and is therefore unique for each. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the curve see Reference 52. The same is true for Figure 38, which represents typical residual
static strength data.
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5. Technology
Analysis must also deal continuously with the technological issues inherent in the tasks. These
must be kept at the forefront, constantly challenging the approach being used. For example, some basic
technology questions that have been raised in the structural disciplines are:
(a) Validity of Goodman's. Necessary constraints.
(b) Failure criteria for ductile material.
(c) Methods for handling fasteners, bolts, threads.
(d) 3D stress field effect on fatigue, fracture mechanics, etc.
(e) Combination of low and high cycle fatigue.
(f) Accumulated linear damage factor rules.
(g) Nonlinear fracture mechanics.
(h) Residual stress.
(i) High cycle fatigue fracture mechanics.
(j) Single cycle versus multiple cycle proof testing.
Similar lists are available for all major disciplines including, but not limited to, systems, thermal,
control, fluid flow, propulsion, flight mechanics, etc.
Key lessons learned are included in the summary.
B. Testing
Testing uses most of these same principles discussed under the analysis section, however, some
additional principles are involved.
1. General
Primarily the principles of testing, whether to acquire understanding or for final verification, are
fundamentally the same as those just listed. Good testing always starts with analysis (pretest analysis) of
the test article and test setup (facilities). This analysis, in conjunction with all the analysis previously
discussed, is used to define test conditions, plans, instrumentation and range, constraints, etc. It is very
important that all test boundary conditions (facilities, test support equipment) be totally understood and
defined. A classical example of understanding boundary conditions occurred on the Saturn I vehicle as a
result of the dynamic test conducted to verify modal analysis used for control system design and loads
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cdetermination. Due to the configuration complexity (cluster tanks) and modal analysis technology (or
lack thereof) analysis to test correlation was not as good as desired. Matching frequencies led to a mis-
match of modes and vice versa. It was hypothesized that the test suspension system was coupling with the
structure altering the modes. One engineer thought that he could remove this effect by special data
reduction/evaluation techniques. Due to data accuracy problems, this process created several psuedo
modes with high gains which coupled with the control system creating an instability. The launch of the
first Saturn I vehicle was delayed a few weeks while the problem was resolved. Much publicity occurred,
even a big article in Fortune Magazine. The problem was resolved by showing that the experimental
modes were accurate and the control was stable. Many successful launches without control system
change verified the decision. Dynamic tests since this time have given proper emphasis to boundary con-
ditions/suspension systems. Many good tests are invalidated because of inappropriate boundary con-
ditions [21 ] or the lack of understanding thereof. The pretest analysis is very useful in controlling the test,
making decisions, and understanding data.
2. Test Conduction/Data
This leads to the next step which is test conduction and data acquisition. As much diagnostic data
and automation should be emphasized as possible to enhance test conduction. Analyzing and evaluat-
ing the data are very important to test success. Establishing various ways of cross plotting, parameteriz-
ing, etc., should be the norm. Many times digitizing the data at high sample rates gives much flexibility
to this process. Part of this process of evaluation is correlating the results to the pretest predictions. Many
times this can be done in real or near real time by storing the predictions in the computer used to analyze
the data. The final step is to update the model/simulation based on the test data. This cannot be
emphasized enough since this model will be used for variations in projected operations, MR (manufactur-
ing requirements or materials requirements deviation) resolution, and operational constraints, etc. All the
previous points in terms of documentation, data basing, communication, etc., apply to testing. The
individual again is the key resource and makes or breaks the test. Much more could be said about testing.
There are many types of test: (1) dynamic, (2) static, (3) fatigue, (4) fracture mechanics, (5) proof, (6)
burst, (7) vibroacoustic (development, qualification, and acceptance), (8) thermal, (9) flow, (10) propul-
sion system hot firing, (11) development flights, etc., all of which have their specialties and nuances.
These are not a part of this paper. Many references exist [17 through 42]. Regardless of the area, how-
ever, one overriding viewpoint is important. One must start with the smallest entity possible and under-
stand it fully, then add the next level and understand it. This buildup continues until the total system is
tested together. This last step may not be accomplished on the ground, but becomes a part of the initial
operational or developmental phase with proper safe guards. This sounds like an advocacy of bottoms up
only. This is not true. Various levels of tests from the tops down should be intermingled in parallel in
order to better understand the parts and the system. Not all testing should be full scale. Scale model test-
ing conducted properly is very valuable and can be a fundamental or predominant part of the test
program. Even flow testing, properly scaled and analyzed, has been very successful as demonstrated in
the field of aeroelasticity. It is mandatory, however, to understand the scaling assumptions and therefore
the limitation to properly interpret the data.
3. Developmental
Development testing to understand the basic phenomenon, define parameters and sensitivity, and
to validate analysis is mandatory for successful design and validation although it is a principle bypassed
many times to save money. This type of testing covers both the environments and the structure as well as
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materials characterization. For example, flow testing of a turbine with various diversion angles, contours,
etc.. can help select the better design and also provide validation of the analytical prediction. Structural
testing can show potential problem areas as well as analysis validation. Destructive testing to understand
failure modes and limits is a good approach, if possible.
4. Static
Static structural testing, and, in particular, testing of large hardware, is difficult to accomplish. It
is mandatory to apply and balance loads properly. This involves not only the load lines (application
method), but the hardware alignment, instrumentation, and backup structure characterization, all of
which are fundamental to getting good data. Two principles are very important here: (1) to look at all the
details but always with the overall system in view, and (2) to understand the test as much as possible from
the analysis viewpoint and determine what can be expected. Testing for testing's sake buys very little. A
third principle that generally comes into play is to have all potential diagnostic tools in place so that as
surprises occur they can be understood and the test can proceed.
5. Summary
Fundamentally, one must fully understand what problem one is trying to solve, intepret, etc., in
order to properly test for it. Running a test with careless analysis data leads to the wrong answer and
future failure. Proper testing requires the team effort between all interacting disciplines with complete,
open lines of communication. This goes from knowing what hardware configuration is being tested to
understanding the test setup and everything in between.
The basic principle in analysis and test, as mentioned in the general section, is to accomplish both
the simplified and detailed analysis. The goal is to design a test program to verify the analysis and corre-
late and adjust the analysis based on the validation. Understanding this approach principle excludes
unforeseen, real world deviations. The proof of the pudding comes from flight testing. One must always
plan for special instrumentation and flight conditions initially to finalize characterization and update
models. This is a must that has its wisdom demonstrated on many space programs [21].
The principles of testing are outlined in the summary.
Some examples of open or critical structural technologies in testing are:
(a) Dynamic impedance testing.
(b) Fracture mechanics plastic testing.
(c) Combined low/high cycle fatigue.
(d) Loads combination.
(e) High frequency loads prediction.
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C. Analysis/Test Summary
In dealing with analysis and test, several principles and lessons learned have been discussed. Out
of all of these has come the overriding principle dealing with integration or systems analysis. If one
attempts to write down all the potential interacting disciplines, the list gets quite lengthy. In addition, for
a given space structure, space vehicle, etc., only a few will apply; however, from the list four nearly
always appear. For example, some of the potential interactions are:
• Thermal-structural
• Structural-control
• Aeroelasticity
• Trajectory-control-structural
• Corrosive-structural
• Propulsion-structural
• Propulsion-control.
The four that stand as pillars requiring special attention are (1) loads, (2) stress, (3) material, and
(4) testing (Fig. 39). One might argue that environments should be included, however, the natural and
induced environment world is very broad and is included in loads and stress. Also, the same principles
apply. Looking at these four, why do they separate out as pillars and what overriding integrating
principle is involved? They separate out because the end product of structural integrity is a statement
about the structure's strength, stability, and durability (strength, fatigue, and fracture). Everything
hinges on this statement - operations, maintainability, life management, etc., including the proof of an
adequate design. A special relationship between these four pillars is required if structural integrity is to be
assured. Support from all other disciplines is obvious but these are the foundation. What there is that is so
fundamentally important with these four is that they cannot be treated as individual black boxes with data
requirements flowing from one to the other, but must be treated as an integrated whole. They must be
worked together with each understanding the technical discipline of the other. Obviously, the same
statement would apply if a structural control interaction problem existed and would require essentially a
new or combined discipline to work. The principle is clear then: for structural integrity, a stress engineer
must know loads, materials, and testing; a loads engineer must know stress, materials, and testing; a
materials engineer must know loads, stress, and testing; while the test engineer must know loads, stress,
and materials. This knowledge must be at a fundamental and working level, not just some generalities.
Application of these interacting disciplines must be a probabilistic or statistical way requiring a working
knowledge of statistical approaches.
The second principle involved here is that they must work together as a team with constant
communication in order to assure good results. Testing not accomplished in terms of the real dynamics
issue gives false security. Materials data bases not compatible with the physical problem or the simula-
tion under development lead to wrong designs, false security, costly redesigns, or failure. The same can
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Figure 39. The four pillars of structural integrity.
be said for the other areas. What is the solution to the problem? As always, no one answer exists; how-
ever, two clear strategies stand out: (1) cross train each engineer for a minimum of 6 months in the other
disciplines, and (2) work the problems as ad hoc or informal teams. The argument against each is
resources, however, the evidence points toward it being more costly not to approach them in some
manner like this. As a minimum, basic understanding in all disciplines and open communications lines
are required. This means that management and organizations must recognize this requirement and plan
for meeting it.
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V. DOCUMENTATION AND DATA BASING
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Documentation and data basing are fundamental and of prime importafice to adequate design. The
importance can be shown in at least two ways: (1) records or reference of requirements, specifications,
assumptions, analysis, test, hardware, manufacturing, etc.; and (2) increased awareness and organization
focus through the documentation effort. There are many ways to categorize documentation for
management and control and design validation. Several levels exist, some under very strict formal con-
trol by program requirements boards, others with only engineering line organizational sign off or
approval. Top level requirements documents requiring very strict legalistic control are the normal
requirements documents, CE! specifications and design drawings, COQs, OMRSDs, etc. At a control
level that is rigid, but not at the same level, are the class of documents which include Design Verification
System (plans) (DVSs) specifications, procedures, criteria, etc. A different group of documentation is
the presentation and results of all major design reviews (PDR, CDR, DCR, FRR, etc.) including a very
formal tracking system for all action items and Review Item Discrepancies (RIDs). Some of this
documentation is formal handouts of presentations. Very important to the whole process is the next level
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of documentationwhich containsall analysisassumptionsandresults, testplansandresults,presenta-
tions, and databases.Data basesgo from naturalenvironments,materialsproperties,environmental
data,analysis,to testresults.As discussedpreviously,thesedocumentsmusttakevariousformsfrom the
very detailedequationsandresultsto sometop level summarystatementandall the levels in between.
The choiceof how to breakout andcontrolthesevariouslevelsis very importantto communicationand
traceability. It is also very importantthat key resultsbe publishedin openliterature so that lessons
learned,etc., get disseminatedthroughoutthe aerospacecommunity.
A. Symbols
The discussion, thus far, tends to be centering on what is done or controlled at each level,
although in some cases this is the same as a bottoms up or tops down type thinking. What is clearly
missing is what symbols, for example, at the lowest level, to:,send up to the higher levels of documentation
or management or conversely, to send down. For example, it is obvious that the detailed equation or
results of a stress analysis are not required; however, the fact that the work was accomplished and some
summary or encompassing symbol should be presented or developed. In this case, maybe it is the
minimum margin of safety in a structure on yield and ultimate. Even the general stress level throughout
the structure may not be required, but colored contour plots of stress level patterns in conjunction with
the minimums may convey more than enough (Figs. 40 and 41). Lateraly, however, or in the case of
audits, detailed communications of every facet of the analysis are required. Also, if design changes or
performance enhancement, etc., occur, the detailed documentation is a must to eliminate complete
reanalysis and test. Matrix-type summaries that list all analysis, test, etc., performed, the responsible
individual, the documentation number, date, and applicable part or structure are very important for trace-
ability, management, and visibility (Fig. 22). Typically, the documentation for structural durability for a
given part would or should flow down as shown on Figure 40, as an example. Obviously, the tree would
vary substantially in terms of number of analyses, test, etc., required to complete the picture; however,
the basic flow down stays the same. Hirsch summarized the need for symbols in Reference 56: "Only by
accumulating shared symbols and the shared information that symbols represent, can we learn to commu-
nicate effectively with one another in our national community." With this brief documentation overview,
the following discussion will deal with basic principles and lessons learned from the reviews.
1. Interdiscipline Communication
Although a wealth of data exists in the materials world, material data bases, or the lack thereof,
and communications between disciplines concerning these materials properties has been a recurring
problem. Evaluating these discrepancies has shown that it is not necessarily a poor documentation
problem but a multi-faceted problem cutting across many areas. In fact, it probably should be classed as
an integration problem. It cannot be stressed enough that adequate communication and understanding exist
across the disciplines. In dealing with the high performance minimum margins system, a very specific
category of data is required to solve or analyze each problem area. This means that all disciplines supply-
ing input data to structural analysis, for example, must understand in detail in terms of the problem being
analyzed and the various data requirements. Otherwise erroneous answers result. Another part of this
problem is the currency of the data base in use. Many instances exist where the proper data was available
but not in the operational data bases. This is a general problem, not just for materials. Materials is being
selected for an example because of its criticality in structural margins assessments. This again points
back to the system focus mentioned earlier.
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2. Problems
Other problems continue to exist in all documentation. Analysis or test reports, parts histories,
and other documentation often cannot be found and if they are, then assumptions, summaries, etc., are
not described. Currency is a major problem. Wrong environments or inadequate models are prevalent.
For example, the SSME structural audit, although showing the engine to be adequately analyzed and
verified, found parts that had limited life without Discrepancy Approval Requests (DARs). The cause
varied between the above to plain oversight. Computer data bases can help in eliminating these problems.
However, as discussed elsewhere, the final responsibility rests with the engineer, technician, etc., doing
the job. He must not just do the work but communicate it.
Examples of documentation have not been shown due to the volume required, however, most are
familiar with it. The major problem appears to be one of schedule and priorities. In a technology pushing
the boundaries, crises continue to occur. This moves one from completing documentation to working the
next problem. A major weakness in documentation is in the high level reports and open literature where
so little of the key problems solved have been published in any form. This must be eliminated for at least
two reasons: (1) the technology community needs the information we have developed, in fact, we owe it
to them since our work is funded by tax dollars; and (2) the professional is due the recognition for his
work by those other than his own management.
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B. Data Bases
Modern computer capabilities with networking extending beyond the local organization to
interacting organizations across the country open up fascinating and mandatory opportunities for
automated data basing. Software programs and computers are very user friendly allowing managers, etc.,
to interrogate the system. Controls have to be established in terms of who and how updating is accom-
plished, who can interrogate, and the formal and legal use of extracted data. In addition, many options
must be built into the programs to interrogate properly and format outputs to fit the users' needs. These
requirements must be established based on needs of all potential users. Flexibility must be built into the
data bases so that they can be expanded, altered, etc. Many examples exist within NASA and its con-
tractors. One very effective one is the SSME dynamic data base [54].
1. SSME Dynamic Data Base
The planned missions for the Space Shuttle dictated a unique and technology-extending rocket
engine. The high Isp (impulse performance) requirements in conjunction with a 55-mission lifetime, plus
volume and weight constraints, produced unique and demanding structural design, manufacturing, and
verification requirements. In order to achieve the higbaperformance (Isp), a two-stage pump system is
used in conjunction with preburners which burn the fuel rich gas, furnishing the power for the pumps.
This extremely hot fuel-rich gas feeds the main combustion chamber, efficiently developing the engine
thrust. This system results in unprecedented operating regimes of temperatures,::pressures, and rotating
machinery speeds. The high rotary speeds and the combustion processes create mechanical, acoustical,
and fluctuating pressure environments. The volumetric and weight constraints drive the design toward a
high concentration of energy and minimum structure sizing (thickness, etc.). The energy concentration
can be illustrated by observing the size of the high pressure fuel pump, which generates 70,000 h.p.
within an envelope 18 in. in diameter by 30 in. long and rotates at speeds up to approximately 40,000
rpm.
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Rotarydynamicsis oneof the morefascinatingfields in dynamics.It is anareaall are familiar
with from onestandpointor another.Any automobiledriver hasexperiencedwheel imbalance,brake
squeal,etc.For theSSME,theseproblemareasarecompoundedseveralordersof magnitudein thehigh
pressurefuelandlox pumpsdueto thehighenergyconcentration(energydensity)andspeedranges.As a
result, supposedlysmall changes(causes)aregreatlymagnifiedin theresponses.Sincebearinglife of
thesepumpsis limited and is to a largedegreea function of thedynamicresponse,the healthof the
pumps is monitoredusing accelerationdata. Thesedataare obtainedfrom a set of accelerometers
mountedon various locationsof the pump housing.
Theimportanceof this informationto theSSMEandtheinability to analyticallydeterminemany
effectsin this machineryhaveledto thedevelopmentof averycomprehensivesetof datareduction,data
evaluationtools, andanautomateddatabankof thesedatafor all hot firings. Over 1,000enginefiring
resultsareavailablein thisdatabank.Problemshavebeencharacterizedandnormalpumpcharacteristics
havebeenstatisticallyformatted.Throughtheuseof this databasesystemandaccelerometerdatafrom
eachenginefiring and Shuttleflights, pumpstatusis determinedandrefurbishmentscheduledaverting
major problems.
First, the responsestatisticsfor threeaccelerometermeasurementson the lox pump for all 109
percentpower level firing (percentof original enginedesignthrust level)areshownon Figure43. Two
tablesaregiven, onefor thecompositelevel (0 to 1,000Hz RMS levels)andtheotherfor synchronous
(levels takenfrom spectrumat rotating speed).Informationcomparableto this for all pumpsandtheir
measurementsandpowerlevels is available.Also,datacanbecompiledbypump,engine,build,etc., as
desired.
A typical pumpresponse(isoplot)is shownonFigure44. Thepredominantresponseis synchro-
nouswith a small2N response.Isoplotsarea seriesof spectrumplotsevery0.4 sec,giving apictorial of
frequenciesversustime. Amplitude is shownbut is hardto readdueto the overlappingof spectrums.
Individual spectrumsareusedto get correctamplitudes.Anomalousbehaviorwould showup asaddi-
tional frequencieson the isoplot.
Figure45 is an isoplotfor a pumpwith rubbing.Noticethedistinct3N (3 timessynchronousfre-
quency)and4N frequencies.Also, noticethatdistinctfrequenciesexistslightly above3N and4N. These
areindicatedon the individualspectrumplacedabovetheisoplot. Many times,thesefrequenciesarenot
constantwith power level butmovearound,indicatingsomethinglike brakesquealgoingon (Fig. 46).
2. Vibroacoustic Criteria
Fundamental to structural integrity of space vehicle components such as gyros, actuators, valves,
electronic boxes, etc., is the development of vibration criteria for calculation of loads and for develop-
ment, qualification, and acceptance testing. These criteria are developed in a pseudo empirical/analytical
manner using data bases consisting of the input acoustical spectrum and a known system including attach
structure and the recorded response spectrum of the input. Categorizing this data by component mass and
attach structure, new criteria for different components mounted on the same type structure can be
developed through scaling the input acoustic spectrum, component mass, and mounting structure thick-
ness. Automating this data base has reduced criteria development efforts by a factor of 3 or 4. Figure 47
shows typical data bank data, while Figure 48 shows the use of that data bank to generate new criteria.
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Figure 43. Statistical summary of SSME vibration data.
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As stated previously, data bases exist in most engineering, operations, and hardware manufactur-
ing areas and are key to structural integrity and to project management. Much work on data bases and the
appropriate reference symbols needs to be accomplished. These data bases should be accessible by both
government and industry organizations that have concerns and should be accomplished with cross
country data linking, as is presently done with the SSME data. Modern scanning devices can greatly
enhance the completeness of these approaches. The design and operation of the Shuttle vehicle have
clearly driven this approach. Future systems must greatly expand it in terms of scope and symbols.
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C. Summary
In the general section, a flow down of the documentation (Figs. 20 through 24) was shown down
to the DVS level. Not shown is much of the supporting documentation to the DVS, such as analysis and
test reports. For these, one important finding or principle is that each analysis, test, etc., should have two
types of summary attached to the basic document: (1) a set of check-off sheets which provide a quick
look at the scope, etc., of the analysis/test; and (2) a summary paragraph or statement of the results. This
latter summary can be used as an input to the next level of documentation and organization. It should be
kept in mind constantly what the objectives of documentation are: (1) communication, (2) organization of
tasks, (3) records of work, (4) data base for operations and maintenance, and (5) insights for product
improvement, etc.
• • T•
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VII. PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA
Procedures and criteria have been combined into one section for convenience. Both are means of
control or setting minimums in terms of approaches or margins. Both have to be controlled very strin-
gently and require periodic review for correctness and applicability. Both are mandatory since they con-
trol the goodness of the hardware, either by how it is analyzed, tested, inspected, manufactured, etc., or
the margins, etc., that are built in to cover unknowns. Procedures cover every aspect of the program from
management, analysis, and testing to manufacturing, maintenance, and operations. Procedures set the
pace for the total program. Some procedures must be rigidly enforced and constantly reviewed while
others are merely guidance. For example, the procedures that control hardware assembly are very critical
while an analysis procedure would be a minimum requirement or guideline. Many times the analyst
would do more than the procedure calls for. Some flexibility should be allowed in these areas.
A. Procedures
Principles that are important to procedures are, in many cases, generic with the one discussed in
other areas. There are unique areas, however.
1. Definitive
First, procedures must be very definitive and clear from two aspects: (1) by whom and how it is
controlled and maintained, and (2) writeup, instructions, and illustrations, etc. Procedures that are not
clear or are changed inadvertently can produce bad results.
2. Requirements
Second, procedures should be written only where required. One should not try to over control
using procedures. The review and maintenance of procedures is a major burden. Elimination of proce-
dures whenever possible is a good guideline. However, every critical action should be covered by proce-
dures. Procedures should be written only when they are mandatory to insure adequate design. Procedures
have a history of becoming bureaucratic, removing flexibility and stifling initiative: They are the means,
not the end. Individual responsibility has been and will continue to be the fulcrum of good design and
hardware.
3. Validation
Third, procedures must be tested and proved before implementation. They should also be as
simple as possible to insure correctness. The range of activities that procedures cover is so large that it is
hard to generalize. A manufacturing procedure is quite different from one for analysis.
4. Involvement
Fourth, all various parts or elements of a project should be involved at some level in develop-
ment of procedures. Engineering, manufacturing, quality management, etc., should have inputs and
reviews to insure adequacy and completeness.
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5. Flexibility
Fifth, procedures should have the flexibility to allow for evolving technology including analysis,
materials, manufacturing, etc. Only with this flexibility can high performance be developed and validated
for low margins, light weight, etc.
B. Criteria
Criteria, as well as procedures, determines the adequacy of the hardware. The design, its
margins, and its sensitivity are governed by the criteria. Criteria covers every discipline, every phase,
and every effort. Design, in general, is no better than the criteria. Areas requiring criteria are: (1)
strength, (2) fracture mechanics, (3) fatigue, (4) structural stability, (5) dynamic and control stability, (6)
deflections, (7) dynamic responses, (8) loads, (9) vibration and shock, (10) thermal, (11) acoustics, (12)
testing, (13) fasteners, (14) inspections, (15) offsets, (16) control, (17) hydraulics, (18) electrical, (19)
finish, (20) materials, (21) bonding, (22) flow (all natural environments), (23) manufacturing, (24)
operations, etc. Criteria are always under strict control. Changes can only be made after detailed review
and approval by all concerned, including PRCBs. If criteria are not met, then, in general, the design is
not adequate by definition. If used as designed, then waivers must be approved by proper boards, etc.
In the early space exploration days, all testing was prototype using dedicated, disposable
hardware. In today's world, the extra cost of building extra sets of hardware has opened up a new world
called protoflight testing and/or verification by analysis, where hardware is flown after testing. This is a
basic issue facing structural engineering since hardware cannot be tested to failure to determine limits.
Verification becomes a combined analysis/test approach and raises new definitions of test procedures and
criteria. This, coupled with time consistent probabilistic environments, opens up many new vistas of
criteria, all of which must be considered and validated. The following areas of criteria must be con-
sidered.
1. Requirements
High performance systems, because of the requirement for very accurate data, etc., drive toward
a change in how criteria are developed and implemented. Instead of the conservative, additive,
equivalent static margins, a probabilistic integrated approach is indicated. This not only means a change
in how the structural data are generated, but also the criteria statement and how it is applied. Obviously,
not all of the currently used criteria approaches are invalid. In fact, the opposite is true. Most are appli-
cable as is or with modifications. What is argued here is an expansion of criteria approaches to include
probabilistic approaches. The principle involved here is to open criteria up (flexibility) to incorporate
currently developed probabilistic approaches required to design high performance, low margin, light
weight structures. As with procedures, all disciplines and elements of the project must be involved in the
development of criteria. One discipline may have the lead, but each must help in the development and
control.
2. Clarity
Criteria must be clear, simple, definitive, etc., so that no confusion or misunderstanding results in
design and verification. Two extremes illustrate what the limitations for developing criteria and these
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applicationsare. In the first extreme,a statementof the following characteris made:"A safe,reliable
systemshallbedesignedandverified that meetsa 3_ probabilisticlevel of 95 percentconfidencethat
includesall considerationsof uncertainties uchasenvironments,materials,analysis,test, manufactur-
ing, etc." This statementallowsflexibility in methods,approaches,etc., usedto meetthisencompassing
statementof criteria.Theotherextremewritesaverydetailedsetof criteriafor eachdisciplinesomewhat
independentof otherdisciplines.This approachtendstowarda conservativedesigndueto the inherent
narrow look of eacharealeadingto lossof flexibility, creativity, andinnovation. Obviously, neither
extremeis desirable,however,thebalancedapproachmusttakethesystemviewpoint andleantoward
the first statement.Thereare many implicationsof taking this approach,including the contractural,
legalistic one. Thesemust also beconsideredin criteria development.
3. Specifics
Clearly, criteria must be specific in that it covers all hardware phases, preliminary design, design,
verification, operations, refurbishment, and life management. Various approaches are apparent. For
example, life management can be only a procedure/criteria for using hardware as verified versus up front
impacting design with criteria that considers refurbishment, operations, maintenance, etc. As stated
previously, the integrated look is mandatory versus a discrete look.
4. Reviews/Updates
Clearly with these same systems and approaches where nonlinear approaches are relied on, failure
criteria needs further definition and quantification. Safety factors and related margins are arbitrary
numbers, supposedly based on cost and success experiences, but really do not correlate to the safety of
the component and system. All safety factors on failure and duration should be referenced to probability
of failure. It would be more significant to estimate the weight, cost, life, or other performance to the
probability of success, and the delta increase required to decrease the risk one more order of magnitude.
The same is true for many exotic materials and composites. An example of the difficulty of developing
criteria is the use of safety factors for nonlinear systems. As long as the system is linear dealing with
loads, stress, and strain give the same results since everything is linear and correlated in this linear
fashion (Fig. 49). If, however, the operating point is in the nonlinear portions of the curve stress, strain,
and loads are related in a nonlinear manner. Notice that for points A and B, when the apparent stress is
projected to the stress strain curve, the difference in apparent stress is substantial while the real stress
changes very little and the strain is large. In the nonlinear portion of the curve, strain increases dramati-
cally with increasing load while stress changes very little. The obvious question for this region becomes
how do you write or derive the safety factor? Do you write it against loads, stress, or strain? Different
numbers result if you do. Classically, safety factors have been developed for linear systems. Current high
performance systems operate in or near the nonlinear range, opening up a redefinition for criteria. Other
examples exist and must be dealt with in a rational manner to adequately verify structures. If safety factor
is defined as loads relative to structure failure, then high strain exists with nominal stress (point A) (Fig.
49). Employing nonlinear stress analysis will define the proper relationship between stress and strain
while the linear analysis will produce the apparent stress. This makes it clear that real stresses and
strains can be determined but keeps the safety factor criteria question open. Obviously, it is better to
design a system where these effects are bypassed. For example, operating in the linear range gives a
properly understood safety factor. Using linear analysis in a nonlinear range would predict failure where
it did not occur and negative margins of safety. The nonlinear analysis predicts correct stress but can be
misleading as to the sensitivity to failure. The principle is clear, continually review and update criteria
commensurate with the materials usage and performance requirements.
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As just discussed, the criteria for any space system (vehicle) is very large and all encompassing,
going from natural and induced environments to operations. The scope of the documentation is too
voluminous to reference or show. In the structures world, typical criteria includes safety factors, vibra-
tion testing, proof testing, fracture mechanics, and environments. All of these have documents that cover
all contingencies. Selected items from some of these have been chosen for illustration.
Vibration testing of components to the expected level as a function of frequency and direction is
conducted at three different levels, namely, developmental testing, qualification testing, and acceptance
testing. No component is qualified until it passes qualificatioja testing. New hardware is accepted only
after passing acceptance testing designed to screen manufacturing flaws. Figure 50, taken from Refer-
ence 41, defines the deviations allowed on the vibration spectra during testing. Criteria differs also
whether one deals with prototype versus protoflight testing. Many other issues such as test time
durations, levels, etc., are defined in the reference.
Structural loads must consider known variations of all environments, models, etc., used to
generate the responses. One example of criteria for the combined probabilities of these parameters for
each launch phase is shown on Figure 51 (taken from Reference 22).
Using the high confidence level limit loads, structural tests are run to verify structural margins.
One example of design safety factors is shown in Figure 52, taken from Reference 22. Many other
combinations and levels of safety factors exist for various verification approaches, hardware, etc. Proof
testing of pressure vessels has many uses and values. Figure 53 shows typical criteria for various pressure
vessel structures [33].
One final example of criteria is shown for fracture mechanics (Fig. 54) [24]. This is a flow chart
from the MSFC fracture mechanics criteria showing the control and selection of fracture critical parts.
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THE TEST SPECTRA SHALL BE VERIFIED BY NARROW BAND SPECTRAL ANALYSIS
USING AN ANALYSIS SYSTEM THAT IS INDEPENDENT FROM THE ANALYZER/EQUALIZER
USED TO CONTROL THE TEST. TOLERANCES CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE AREAS FOLLOWS:
• VIBRATION +10%
COMPOSITE ROOT MEAN SQUARE ACCELERATION
ACCELERATION SPECTRAL DENSITY
(TOLERANCES PERTAIN TO BANDWIDTHS OF 25 Hz OR LESS)
+100%
-30%
SINUSOIDAL PEAK ACCELERATION +20%
-10%
SINUSOIDAL CONTROL SIGNAL MAXIMUM
HARMONIC DISTORTION
+10%
FREQUENCY +5%
TEST DURATION
eSHOCK SPECTRUM
+10%
-0%
SPECTRUM PEAK ACCELERATION
(WHEN ANALYZED WITH A 1/3 OCTAVE SHOCK SPECTRUM
ANALYZER AND 5% DAMPING)
+40%
-20%
• SHOCK PULSE
AMPLITUDE +40%
-20%
DURATION +10%
Figure 50. Vibration spectra tolerance.
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MISSION PHASE
PRELAUNCH
LAUNCH
ASCENT
SEPARATION
SPACE
ENTRY
ATMOSPHERIC
FLIGHT
DEFINITION OF PROBABILITY VALUE
PROBABILITY OF NOT HAVING TO RETURN A VEHICLE FROM THE PAD
TO THE ASSEMBLY AREA, OR TO IMPLEMENT SPECIAL TIE-DOWN
PROCEDURES BECAUSE OF STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY LIMITATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO THE PRELAUNCH GROUND ENVIRONMENT.
PROBABILITY OFNOT HAVING TO DELAY A LAUNCH BECAUSE OF STRUCTURAL
CAPABILITY LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE LAUNCH GROUND
ENVIRONMENT.
PROBABILITY OF NOT HAVING TO DELAY A LAUNCH BECAUSE OF STRUCTURAL
CAPABILITY LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE ANTICIPATED ASCENT
ENVIRONMENT.
PROBABILITY OF NOT HAVING TO ABORT A MISSION BECAUSE OF STRUCTURAL
CAPABILITY LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SEPARATION ENVIRONMENT.
PROBABILITY OFNOT HAVING ABNORMAL SPACE OPERATIONS OF
STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE ASSOCIATED
ENVIRONMENTS.
PROBABILITY OF NOT HAVING TO ALTER THE ENTRY FLIGHT PLAN BECAUSE OF
STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY LIMITATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ANTICIPATED
ENTRY ENVIRONMENT
PROBABILITY OF NOT HAVING TO DELAY ENTRY ORNOT HAVING TO SELECT AN
ALTERNATE LANDING SITE BECAUSE OF STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY LIMITATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO ANTICIPATED ATMOSPHERIC ENVIRONMENTS.
LIMIT-LOAD
PROBABILITY LEVEL
(95% CONFIDENCE)
99%
99%
95%
99.9%
99%
99%
99%
-.1 Figure 51. Illustrative limit-load probabilities.
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COMPONENT
GENERALUNPRESSURIZED STRUCTURE
WINDOWS, DOORS, AND HATCHES
PRESSURIZED STRUCTURE**
PRESSURIZED LINES AND FITTINGS
MAIN PROPELLANT TANK
PRESSURE VESSELS (OTHER THAN pROPELLANT TANKS)
YIELD
>1.0
FACTORS
ULTIMATE
1.5
3.0
1.52.0
1.1
2.5
1.4
2.0
PROOF
1.5
1.05
1.5
** FOR PRESSURIZED STRUCTURE, BOTH ULTIMATE FACTORS OF SAFETY INDICATED SHOULD BE APPLIED
AS FOLLOWS:
1.5 x LIMIT LOAD +1.0 x LIMIT PRESSURE (i.e.,1.5 x LIMIT LOAD APPLIED AT LIMIT PRESSURE)
AND
0 x LIMIT LOAD +2.0 x LIMIT PRESSURE (i.e., 2.0 x LIMIT PRESSURE APPLIED AT ZERO LIMIT PRESSURE)
Figure 52. Factors of safety.
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Figure 53. The effect of wall thickness on value of proof test.
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Figure 54. Fracture control selection and disposition of parts.
Thesesnapshotshave shownonly brief glancesat criteria. In the aerospaceworld of manned
flight, crit'eriaandthevalidatingdocumentsrequiredto verify that hardwarehascomplied,constitutea
major effort of structuraldesign.Understandingof criteria andplansto incorporateit becomekey to
adequatestructuraldesign.
C. Summary
It is not the purpose of this report to provide guidelines for developing or baselining procedures or
criteria. Nor is it intended as a reference of all these documents, however, some typical ones are listed in
the references. Also under documentation, a typical flow down was provided and is applicable uni-
versally. As is evidenced by this and other listings, the process starts with requirements and the asso-
ciated procedures and criteria and flows down into ICDs, specifications, OMIs,, OMRSDs, FMEA-
CILs. hazards analyses, etc., necessary to verify that requirements have been met.
VIII. SUMMARY
The experience gained through audits and other exercises, coupled with past engineering
expertise, have led to the formulation of lessons learned and general principles leading to adequate design
and verification of structural systems as applied to space vehicles and space systems. This compilation is
obviously not all inclusive nor complete but represents a partial listing of the conclusions reached by
several involved in these activities. The interpretations are the author's. Using these guidelines, design
and verification of a space system should be improved; however, it is the nature of this business that
problems will occur. In fact, it has been and will be that the preponderance of what we have learned
comes because of the presence of problems. A summary listing of lessons learned is contained in the
following.
Lessons Learned
A. Philosophy
1. Validated design requires both top down (system) and bottom up (part) approaches
a. Top Down
(1) Discipline and component interaction emphasized
(2) Focuses output
b. Bottom Up
(1) Drives detailed penetration at local levels, etc.
(2) Emphasizes special disciplines.
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2. Sensitivity of all parts of system to key parameters must be started initially and continued
through program in order to focus efforts on key effects. Eliminates poor design.
3. Robustness is the secret to good design and quality. Quality control (inspections) is for insurance
and risk reduction.
4. Design and manufacturing in quality do not depend on inspection.
5. Plan initially for adequate development and verification instrumentation from part through flight
testing.
6. Clearly define failure philosophy up front (fail safe, fail operational-fail safe).
7. Fracture mechanics and all special requirements must be incorporated as a design philosophy up
front to insure adequate coverage.
8. Design where practical for high (peak) stresses to occur in parent material instead of welds.
9. Eliminate coupling (3-D effects), static and dynamic in design where possible.
10. Design for margins linearly, test to prove it, inspect to verify, invoke nonlinearities for surprises.
11. Derive criteria to force hardware to meet philosophy, requirements, objectives, etc.
B. General
1. Performance requirements determine design and sensitivity to variations and must be thoroughly
understood and worked to reduce risks, etc. The higher the performance requirements, the higher
the sensitivity of the design.
2. Innovative approaches in analysis, testing, and management are key to flexibility and accuracy.
3. Models are just that, models, only as good as the assumptions used.
a. All analyses are simulations which are not complete (limited), which attempt to predict trends
and what will happen. Models are not exact representations of physical laws.
b. Test (components, subsystems, systems, scale, etc.)only partially replicates real life situations
It is biased by the limited insight and provisions of the test engineer.
c. How do you put these together to get a validated design is the major problem that must be
addressed.
4. Design breaks down with lack of coordination and definition of part/vehicle interface
requirements, etc.
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C. Management and Control
1. The use of independent reviews/analyses, etc., is a prime means of eliminating errors. Several
levels of reviews are available and should be used.
a. Management overview/audits
b. Independent check
c. Independent analysis
d. Independent codes
Comprehensive reviews of results/approaches to insure discipline interaction and completeness are
a fundamental part of these reviews.
2. Communication between disciplines, etc., is mandatory. Management must insure that the
openess, lines of communication, etc., are clearly emphasized and implemented.
3. Methodology, procedures, criteria, etc., must be under essentially constant review to insure
applicability of assumptions, etc., and adequate design.
4. People are the prime resource, all other resources are aids to the human. The individual accept-
ance of the responsibility of the tasks and to growth, communication, and planning is the key to
success. Managements' emphasis on people must be the first priority.
5. Requirements up front for flight certification, overhaul, life extension, etc., are mandatory as a
management tool for control to insure correct design.
6. Proper determination and manning of skills is essential from program start to finish. Do not allow
reduction as cost savings, etc.
7. Management must assure that proper interface symbols, etc. exist and flow vertically and horizon-
tally.
8. Prioritization of tasks toward results, both long range and immediate, is a prime task.
D. Analysis and Test
I. Methodology is one of the keys to accuracy providing:
a. Flexibility
b. Usability
c. Adaptability
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and must match what is expected from analysis, requires periodic review for validity, is
implemented through structural manuals, procedures, handbooks, etc., and must cover all areas
such as:
(1) Loads combination
(2) Fatigue
(3) Fracture mechanics
(4) Modeling
(5) Environments
2. Analysis is only as good as the development and validation testing. Required are:
a. Pretest predictions, procedures, requirements, instrumentation
b. Test analysis correlation
c. Analysis update based on test.
3. Validation of margins requires the establishment of as-built data bases on key structures, etc.
Typical parameters are:
a. Weld offsets
b. Weld Kq's
c. Misalignments
d. Flaws.
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4. Data bases maintained, communicated, and controlled are key to analysis validity (automated
preferred). Examples:
a. Materials properties
b. Vibration
c. Internal fluid flow
d. Environments, natural and induced
e. Margins, durability, etc.
5. The engineer'schoiceof codes,elements,assumptions,etc., determinesoutput validity. The
otherside of this coin is validity of input data.Codes,etc., cannotbe usedindiscriminately.
Involved are:
a. Elementchoices
b. Linearversusnonlinear
c. Compatibility betweenelementsandenvironments,etc.
6. Materialscharacterizationis the singlemostimportantitem in durability. It mustmatchdetails
and assumptionsof models.
7. Sensitivity analysisis key to understandingsystemand bracketinglimitations.
8. Updatinganalysis,etc., asdesignchanges,computational/methodologyimproves,etc., mustbe
a continuousactivity.
9. Statistical significanceof resultsis necessaryfor proper interpretation.
10. Well definedand implementedstructuraltestprogramsare a validation must.
11. Developmenttesting,componentand system,is requiredto properlydetermineenvironments.
12. Efficiency and accuracycanbe improvedthroughuseof:
a. Stressand loadstransformations
b. Automatedscreening
c. Load indications
i_ " •
d. Statistical significance
e. Graphing and displays.
13. Input environments accuracy as a function of response sensitivity is one key to cost effective
design.
14. System approaches are required for understanding and validation.
15. Compatibility must exist between all models, environments, etc.
16. Analysis technologies must match the analysis/performance requirements. Examples:
a. Combination of low cycle frequency and high cycle frequency
b. Low and high cycle fracture mechanics
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c. Plastic fracture mechanics
d. Nonlinear (local) yielding
17. Current problems in analysis/test (short-comings)
a. Data to support Goodman's diagrams
b. Failure criteria for ductile material
c. Bolts/fasteners/threads
d. 3-D effect on fatigue
e. Combination low cycle frequency and high cycle frequency
f. Accumulated linear damage rules
g. Nonlinear fracture mechanics
h. Techniques for residual stresses
i. Analysis and test turnaround time much too long for proper program impact. Example: 1 year
cycle for system loads analysis.
18. Integrated analysis/optimized design from overall viewpoint increases understanding,
efficiency, and margins.
E. Documentation and Data Basing
1. Documentation is a must and requires clear statements of assumptions, data, etc., including trace-
ability identification.
2. Lack of traceability of documentation is a major problem in validation.
3. Documentation must occur at all levels, have various levels of control, and include as a minimum:
a. Requirements
b. ICD's (interface control documents'
c. Procedures
d. Methodology
e. Plans and schedules
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f. Analysisand test results
g. Criteria
h. Specifications
i. Drawings
j. Manufacturingand quality records,etc.
k. Photographsand films.
4. Documentationshouldbe locatedin a centralplaceor haveclearlydefinedareaof where it is.
Working papersin someone'sdeskarenot sufficient.
5. It is very helpful for traceability to have top level breakoutsof documentby disciplinesand
categoriesso that a quick determinationcan be madeof what documentto searchfor.
6. Automateddatabasingis amustfor currenthighperformancesystemscuttingacrossmanyareas
suchas:
a. Vibration
b. Environments
c. Material properties
d. Life specifications
e. Specialanalyses
f. Test data
g. Hardwareusage.
7. Adequatelife managementandrefurbishmentrequirescontinuoususeof theseautomateddata
bases.
8. Databasesmust havecontrol proceduresestablishedto insurefidelity but mustbe accessibleto
users.
F. ProceduresandCriteria
1. Procedures/criteria/philosophyarethebackboneof designandverification.They shouldcontain:
a. Criteria definition
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b. Handbooksrequired,etc.
c. Proceduresand guidelines(standardizationof approaches)
d. Interaction/sequencingor flow
e. Communicationlines
i
f. Working groups/boards/panels, etc.
g. Control/management.
2. Analysis and test procedures should not be so restrictive as to kill innovation, improvements, and
special applications, but should define minimum type approaches, standard methods, etc.
Handbooks fall into the same category.
3. Criteria should be clear and definitive, spelling out boundaries, exceptions, etc. In general,
criteria are very strict legal requirements.
4. Criteria and procedures should be under continuous revision to insure applicability and adequacy.
5. Procedures applied indiscriminately can result in erroneous data.
6. Establishment of life management criteria is the secret to safe hardware operations.
7. Criteria should be developed for all areas including manufacturing and quality. For example, weld
offsets are not always specified, creating hardware lifetime problems.
L
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